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IllTRO:OOCTION
,·

In 1957, Adam Rapacki, Foreign" Minister of Poland, proposed that

a zone be created in Central Europe in which nuclear weapollQ of all
kinds would be prohibited.

The zone � to inoluda the countries of

West Germany, F.ast Germany, Poland, and Czeohoslovald.a..

This paper

seeks to s tuey- that proposal in the ligb.t of its background and conse
quences.

The purpose of such a stuey-, beyond the b9peful accretion

of knowledge, is to fo:rm conclusions based on the analysis of the pro
posal as the beginning of a solution to the political and military
impasse in Central Europe.
'lhe proposal will be studied in seven chapters which are topi

"

cally arransed.

Chapter One considers the background to the proposal

in terms of the security of Central Europe.

Cha:pter � considers the

ba.okground with regard to Central European disarmament.
!tbree deals with the Ra.pa.old. proposal itself.

Chapter

Chapter Four discusses

the pivotal role pl8¥8d by West Germany in regard to the Rapacki PlanJ
Chapter Five considers the Western rejection of the Planf Chapter Six
reflects the continuing in:f'luenoe of' the Plan; and Chapter Seven sum
marizes briefly and fo:rmulates conclusions.

These conclusions will

attempt to show that the Ra.pacld. proposals did not receive a fair
hearing in 1957-1958, a.hd ..that present day circumstances might indi
cate a reappraisal of the proposal's 1>ossibilities by the West.

1

THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
luring the years immediately following the Second World War the
United States began large scale demobilization of its armed forces and.
began withdraw.ins to within its continental shorea. Within a short
time, lhlsaia �ted presmu-e in the lilack Sea area, the Mediterranean
area, and in.Central Europe.
.

.

under the pseudonym of

''Mr.

George F. Kennan, writing in July,

1947

X11 , proposed a positive course of action

to counteract the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union.

�is course ot

action, he said, should not make the Bussiana lose prestige; but cer
tainly

11 .J.it is clear that the main element of any United States
�
.
policy must be that of a long te:rm, patient but firm and vigilant oon1
tainment of Russian expansive tendencies".

The war-exhausted world seemed

Wby was containment necessary?
ready_ to explode·again.
Gennaey.

This time the threat was lblssia rather than

The demobilization of armed forces following the war had

not reduced the. Russian threat; for where the Bed Army- had pushed out
the Ge:rmans, there the Red Army remained.

Stalin was ta.kin no chances

that a repetition of the inva.aion by German forces to within sight of
the Kremlin could ocour againo

With the Baltic States under control,

lhlssia now sought to control the Central European States lying between
Tolssia and Western Europe.

The dominated territory included Poland,

Czechoslovakia, East Ge:rmany, Hunga.ry, .Austria, Bumania, Mgaria,

.l,

George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 25, July 1947, P• 575•
1

2
Yugoslavia, and Albania. From the Arctio Circle to the semi-tropical
Mediterranean, Soviet armed forces helped to install Communist govern
�key felt pa.rt of her territory threat

ments on the Russian pattern.

ened and was pressured to allow at least partial Russian control of the
Bosporus Straits.

Greece was beseiged by Communist guerillas. Both

France and Italy had large, powerful Communist Parties that usually
followed Moscow directives.

The buffer extended from North to South,

/�

from 200 to 500 miles wide between Russia. and what she conceived as the
aggTessor nations to the West.
Facing this monolith of power was a. disorganized Western Europe,
exhausted and in rubble.

If oontaiDinent was the desired goal, .America.

would have to revise her thinking a.bout involving herself in European
affairs.

There was such a. shift in American th1nk1ng. It began to

bear :f:ruit in 1947:

the year Kenna.n's article appeared, the year the

Marshall Plan was-inaugurated, and the year that the United States took
over from Great Britain the underwriting of the anti-Communist efforts
in Greece and �key. Conta.iDinent was beginning to develop.
Stalin, meanwhile, had become annoyed with Tito. The Yugoslav _
leader did not owe his regime to Soviet armed forces. He had developed
his own cha.in of command v.m.ch Stalin could not seem to penetrate. This
breach of authority could not be tolerated by the Soviet leader because
if' national communism swept into the other satellites his wall of states
would be drastically weakened. Gomulka, in Poland, was already speak
ing of a Polish pa.th to socialism and the achievement of socialism by
evolutionary rather than compulsory means. So from Stalin's view,
Titoism had to be stopped.

!n 1947 Stalin ordered the to:rmation of

3
the CoIIllllUllist In:f'ormation :Bureau seemingly for the sole purpose of
ousting Tito :f'ram the Communist bloc. This formal break came in June
of 1948, and was supplemented by the attempted implementation of eco
nomio sanctions against Yugoslavia by many of the bloo countries. �us
there was substantial pressure on Tito to align himself with Stalin;
but there was also pressure applied :f'rom the other Communist countries.
The yea:r 1948 in the Soviet bloc seems to be a y-ear in which the reins
were tightened, so to speak. This fact, for example, is visible in the
Czechoslovak ooul?, r.arnu)ka's replacement by Bierut in Poland, and the
East German Conmunist · indifference to a parliamentary facade. �is
tightening is also seen in the Soviet pressure at a weak liDk of the
West,

viz., :Berlin.

Located deep within the Soviet sector, the former

capital had also been divided among the victors. The Western sectors
were cut off :f'rom West Germany, and were, therefore, quite dependent
on Soviet desires to hOllor the agreement concerning access routes
through the Russian sector.

Stalin ordered these routes blockaded in

an attempt to force the West out of Berlin altogether. The United
States responded to this challenge by instituting the Berlin Airlift,
a gigantic and successful effort to maintain both directions of the
flow of goods entirely by aircraft transportation. The weak link was
stronger than Soviet planners had imagined.
However, after the CoIIllllUllist � _gl � in Prague in 1948, the
Soviet Union had its wall of stone ·right through the heart of EuropeJ
a wall consisting of states governed by men absolutely loyal to Moscow.
To a great extent, Russian danination had been extended to the Elbe

4
Ri r, a feat the Czars could not equal. The existence of this power
bloc created a desire on the pa.rt of the West to present a defensive
front that was as strong and as unified as possible. Therefore, on.
March 17, 1948, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Imcembourg signed the Brussels Paot which bound them in a defensive
g:L"ouping for 50 yea.rs.

The Brussels Pact, also called the Western

European Union, was used as an example of legitima� defense grouping
by the Vandenberg Resolution which the United States Senate passed in
June of 1948. Negotiations ensued between the United States, Canada,
and the Brussels Pact powers crulmjnating in the signing of the North
Atlantic 'h-eaty on April 4, 1949. Thus by the time the Berlin Blockade
was officially lifted in May of 1949, the Western powers had erected
an alliance structure which bound the United States to the defense of
Western Europe. As ChurchilLsa.id, "Europe began to rest under the

-

2

precarious protection of .American nuclear powr."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was electrified by the
outbreak: of hostilities in Korea and the evidence of Soviet nuclear
capabilities. Th.a West plunged into an intense program of rearmament
and decided that West Germany should be pe:rmitted to join the mili
tary effort. Just how the former enemy was to be rearmed was a problem.
The initial solution was the European Defense Community, a supranational
defense organization that did not include Great Britain or the United
States. This solution crumbled with the failure of' the French National
.Assembly to accept the agreement, probably because Britain was not a
2

u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
Disarmament, "Disarmament and Security in Europe," Staff Stud;y Number
Five, Control and Reduction 2f. .Armaments, Report 2501, 85th Congress,
2nd Session, 19513°, p.223.
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member and because of fear and distrust of Germany.

This clearly seemed

to be a victory for the Communists, who had actively opposed the Comrmmity.
However, in 1954, the United States and Great Britain participated in

con

ferences with the West Europeans whioh resulted in the revision of the
Brussels Pact to permit West Germany to join NATO as a military contri
butor.
The-Russians, even before the NATO treaty was signed, had blanketed
Ea.at Europe with bilateral allia.noes.

This network extended from Russia

to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria., Hungary, Rumania, and Poland.

1950's

3

As the

began, therefore, the demarcation line resembled a trip-wire with

ma.s_sive concentrations of armed strength on either side (See Append.ix A).
Both sides faced eaoh other with nuclear capabilities; each could destroy
the other, but in so doing each faced its own destruction.

A necessary

d.etente began.
This detente.was seemingly given a somewhat altered basis by the
death of Stalin in 1953.

With the brief emergence of Malenkov swiftly

followed by Khrushchev as the new leader, the hope grew in the West that
the death of the Russian dictator might somehow change the aggressive
ness of Russian foreign policy.
liberalization of Soviet policy.
way.

This hope was fed by an occasional
East German leaders 'W8Jlt the opposite

In the uncertainty following Stalin's death, they attempted to

show their control by depriving certain groups of their ration cards,
and by increasing work norms by lo%.

Because of resultant bitternesa,

and in the hope of a.fi'eoting West·German elections, the East German

3

Ibi� ,page 234.

6
Government granted concessions to the people, admitted errors, and pro4

mised remedial action.

But before the concessions could be made the

anger of the workers broke into revolt. The strikes became demon
strations which turned into riots that the Soviet Army had to pu.t down.
Soviet willingness to use force to retain Fast Ge:rmany made reunification
an even more important issue in the West German campaign. Russia than
let it be known that the unity of Germany would be impossible if West
5
Ge� joined NATO.
Nonetheless, there seemed to be a movement of Soviet policy in the
direction of a thawing of aggressive tendencies. Even while the Russian
forces were crushing riots in East GermaJ:zy, Soviet relations with Turkey
brightened. Russia dropped her post-war claims against part of Turkey's
territory and dropped the demand for a partial control of the Straits.
Relations with the Middle East were improved, and M'alenkov expressed
peaceful intentions toward Afghanistan and I.ran. Russia began oontri
blting to the United Nations• program for underdeveloped countries and
6

did not interfere with the Korean truce.

These evidences of a. thaw

led some writers such as Isaao Deutscher to conclude that Stalinism
was being :replaced by a more liberal spirit.

1

Others found no such

4
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, � Govermnent Et. Germa.n,y. (New York:
Thomas Crowell Co., 1961), p. 172.
. 5
Philip Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October, 1953, pp 20-33.
6

Ibid

7-

Isaao Deutscher, Russia� Next, (New York: Oxford Universi-ty
Press, 1953), P• 125. See also Robert.Tucker, "The Politics of Soviet
De-Staliniza.tion," World Politics, Vol. 9, July, 1957, P• 550•
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comfort. Yet the evidence that some change in policy had taken place

was given a strong boost by the Soviet agreement, in 1955, to grant a
peace treaty to .Au.stria.. This treaty ended ten years of negotiations
8

and was probably caused by Karl Renner•s 1945 maneuvering, .Austria••
a.ocep,tance of a neutral status, and a thaw in Soviet policy. 'lllia
agreement provided an additional basis for hope in the West; as did
the easing of relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, and the denun
ciation of Stalin at the Twentiet,J:r Party Congress. Moreover, on
February 14, 1956, Kru.shchev made a public speech in which he pro
claimed three important principles of Soviet foreign policy:

the

principle of peaceful coexistence between the two opposed systems, re
jection of the inevitibility of war, and the approval of various forms
9
of transition to socialism.
Krushohev felt e:x:te:rnally secure or he would not have made the
statement. The inclusion of a rearmed Ge� into NATO following
the Paris Agreements of 1954 had been followed by the 1955 formation
of the Warsaw Pact, binding Russia and her satellites in a mutual
defensive alliance. Moreover, the ostensible relaxation of pressure
in Central Europe had the tendency to weaken the Western cohesivenessH
and while hope remained alive, voices wore also heard urging caution.
Henry Kissinger, for example, called pe�oef'ul coexistence "the most
-Bruno Kreisey, "Austria Draws the Ba.lance," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 37, January, 1959, P• 270
9
Philip Mosely, "Soviet Foreign Policy: .New Goal or New
Manners?" ForeiQl Affairs, Vol. 34, July, 1956, P• 545•

8
efficient offensive tactic, a more effective means to subvert the exist10
ing order."
Others sa.w peaceful coexistence e.s the natural result of
11
the l'.Illolear sta.lamate •

The effects of Khrushohev•s ea.sing of tension were profound in the
satellite countries. 'lhe rapprochement with Tito threw oon:f'u.sion into
Party ranks. The newMosoow line necessitated a shift that in many cases
was diffioult to make since it voided past decisions against 'l'i-toists
12
in their ovm ranks.
Then, when Khrushchev dathroned Stalin, the father
image seemed to era.sh to the ground. Poland and Hungary were parti
oularly affected.

The Polish reaction began with the June 28, 1956 worker's revolt

in Poznan. Kb.rushohev's so-called Secret Speech had been in Februa.r,n
e.nd the Stalinist Polish leader, :Beirut, had died in March. The revolt
was in the form of a protest march in Posnan; a serious and yet somewhat ga;y march in which many Communists joined. The marchers were pro
testing tight labor controls, and the movement reflected general un-

rest in the country. As a. result of the unrest Gomulka. was released
from house arrest in August and took over the Party again. He gained

almost immediate popular support by deman� economic reforms and national
sovereignty. He fought it out with Khrushchev and won several concessions.
lOJ::renry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy,"
Foreiw Affairs, Vol. 35, October, 1956, P• 44.

· 11 or� W.W. Kulski•s reply to a Disarmament Subcommittee

questionaire recorded in: Control� Reduction ,2! Armaments,
Report 2501, P• 400.
12An example of this is Slansky1 s execution in Czechoslo
vakia partly because of alleged Titoist ideas. cf. Sir Robert
Lockhart, "Report on Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, April,
1955, P• 484.

9
The Soviet Leader was not satisfied with Gomulka; and yet Khrushchev's
hands were somewhat tied in that the crushing of Gomulka would have re
versed. the direction of his own policy in regard to Tito and Stalin.
This same reasoning could have also applied to Hungary's subse
quent attempt to attain sovereignty.

Imre Nagy seemed slated to be

Hungary's "Gomulka", but by the time he had been called in,
the panicked Connnunist leadership had already called
for military aid against the people. In consequence, the
revolution, under the pressure of conflict, quickly moved
beyond the 'national Communist' position to one that was
increasingly anti-Connnunist and anti-Soviet. The Soviet
decision to crush the revolution by force seems to fol
low directly from this movement beyond the confines of
Communism and the Warsaw Pact. 11 13
11 •••

Hungary was far too important in the buffer wall of states for
Russia to relinquish, especially with Austria non-aligned.
could not have explained that breach in the wall at home.

Khrushchev
Besides, a

Hungarian success would undoubtedly have begun a wave of such revolts;
he might have thought that armed intervention would be necessary sooner
or later anyway.

Fortunately for Khrushchev, Britain and France were

involved in the Suez fiasco at this time, and the Eisenhower Adminis
tration in Washington seemed to have no intention of carrying out the
campaign declarations of Eisenhower with regard to the freeing of the
captive nations of East Europe.

14

The risk of a general conflict in

13
Henry Roberts, "The Crisis in the Soviet Empire," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 3.5, January, 19.57, p. 193.

14

"Ike Would Free East Europe," New York Times, June 8, 19.52,
Po .52; See also a clarification in regard to whether violence would
be used to free East Europe, August 14, 19.52, P• l; and August 26, 19.52,
PP• 1, 12.

10
which everyone would lose seemed too great to the United States.
The Polish and Hungarian revolts did prove that resistance to to
tali tarianiem was possible albeit shortlived, and a possible reason for
this was the apparent fluctuation in Soviet policy since Stalin's death.
The policy seemed to fluctuate between a reluctance to altar the old
ordar and a desire to grant concessions. But the net effect of any
thaw in Soviet policy on Central l!au-ope was slight. The propensities
for change seemed enlarged but within definite limits. Those limits
were dictated by the seClU'ity interests of the Soviet Union that were in
turn apparently dictated by the confrontation of opposed forces in
Central Europe�
The Ra.pacld. Plan attempted to break this deadlock by removing
part of the reason that the Soviet bloc was

coming increasingly con

cerned about Central Europe-nuclear weapons. The proposal was a re
action of concern not just because of the deadlocked security aspects
of the area; but also because of the known American desire to share
its nuclear devices with the West Germans.15 The� NATO Conference in 1957 at Bonn had deferred the question of the sharing of

these weapons by the NATO allies until the Dsoembe:r meeting in Paris.
This deferral was for the purpose of aiding .Adenauer in his election·;,;
in Germany, in which ha was under considerable pressure from the
Social Democrats to refuse nuclear armaments entirely.16 The SDP main
tained that GeJ:man possessions of . such weapons would weaken the
15 11Nato," Tims, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, P• 180
l6 11 0ur Atanio Defense," Newsweek, Vol. 49, � 13, 1957, P•50•

ll
possibilities for reunification ·by endangering the Soviet Union. There
fore the timing of the Rapacki Plan in early October of 1957 sought the
beginnings of a solution to the security problems of Central Europe, but

, to the rearming of Poland's former enemy with
with specific reference
:nuclear potential.17 This was most undesirable both to the Poles and

to the Soviet Union.
17
"Poland Will Cut Forcea, n , !!?!, � Times, February 17,1960,
P• 2., and Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in u.s. Rejection,"!!!!
� Times, April 8, 1962, P• 19.

DISARMAMENT IN A CENTRAL EUROPEAN. CONTEXT
Rapacki's proposals are also part of the age-old quest for dis
armament. The beating of swords into plowshares was a goal already
in ancient Biblical times.

But, seemingly, man had.never· been ready

for the utopia called for by such a goal; the ideal of disarmament
had often been followed by the reality of war, and quite often the
war had been followed by the hope for an end to arms.

So it was again

when the death of Stalin seemed to change the direction of events.
Winston Churchill tied Western hopes for a new era to the reduction
of arms in a speech before the House of Commons in May of 1953.

He

said:
"We all desire that the Russian people should take
the highest place in world affairs that is their due,
without feeling anxiety about their security. I do not
believe that the immense problem of reconciling the se
curity of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western
Europe is insolvable. Indeed, if the United Nations
organization had the authority and character for which
its creators hoped, it would be solved already••••
"The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was in my mind. It was
the highest point reached between the wars•••it was based
upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France
we should stand with the French, and if France attacked
Germany we should stand with the Germans. The scene today,
its scale, its factors, is widely different and yet I have
a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno
might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the
minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate
the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind."1
Perhaps Churchill was ahead of his time.
pressed was widely shared.
1

Bryon Dexter,
October 1953, p. 34.

11

But the hope he ex-

Even though this beginning of optimism

Locarno Again," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32,

12

13
was expressed, there also existed the strong desire to strengthen
both defensive and offensive capabilities.

Recent showdowns of

force throughout the world, the crushing of the East Garman re
volts, and repeated difficulties in Berlin were convincing reminders
of the necessity of continuing to arm.

Malenkov spoke of the

danger for all men in a nuclear war2, but these official pronounce
ments could not always be taken at face value. The West could not
turn from the path of strength--the trust was not there.

Vice

President Nixon expressed this when he said that the United States
had adopted a new principle of foreign policy.
" •.. the new principle summed up is this; Rather than let
the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in
little wars we should rely in the future primarily on our
massive mobile retaliatory power which we would use in our
discretion against the major source of aggression at times
and places we choose."3
In this Nixon was echoing Secretary of State Dulles' policy of
massive retaliation4, and responding to the threat from the Soviet
Union.

Bloc stood against bloc in an organized fashion by 1955;

like 11 two old time gunslingers each with a loaded six-shooter,
each with the drop on the other. ,,5 There seems to be no doubt
that these were days of extreme tension.

u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, 85th Congress,
2nd Session, 1958, Report 2501, p. 378-;2

311Nixon Takes Strong Stand", ��Times, March 14,
1954, p. 1.
4John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace·;"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3 2 , April 1954, pp. 353-364.
5
11Where We Would Disengage If," Newsweek, Vol. 54,
August 24, 1959, p • .37.

14
Disarmament activity was given a great imi;etus by the major
Soviet concession concerning Austria.

It seemed like a tremendous

break-through, a beginning of a new thaw in the Cold War, and the
possibilities of German reunification seemed much brighter.

It

was in this atomosphere both of strength and of hope that the
SUmmit Conference of the Heads of State met in Geneva in

1955. The

important con£erees were Eisenhower, Anthony Edan, Bulganin,. and
Khrushchev.
The conference almost immediately ran into a procedural
problem that forestalled any real progress.
emphasize Russian security in Central Europe:

Bulganin. wished to
" ••• our eventual

objective should be to have no foreign troops remaining on the
6 He added that German
territories of the States of Europe."
rearmament and inclusion within NATO were obstacles to German
reunification because they represented a threat to the security

of the Soviet Union.7

Eisenhower remarked that while he under

stood the security interests of the Soviet Union, prior considera
tion should be given the reunifying of Germany by free elections,
and the new nation must be free to choose its own defensive alliances.
Besides this, Eisenhower felt that it was time to consider giving
the peoples of East Europe the freedom to choose their own form
8

and type of government.

Whether Germany or security came first-

6
Anthony Eden, Full Circle, (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1960) p. 330.
7Ibid.

8Ibid.,
pp. 328-329.
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that was the problem.
Anthony Eden sought to remove this deadlock by dealing with
both security and reunification simultaneously.
"The original Eden Plan was advanced by Sir Anthony
Eden, then Foreign Secretary, at the Berlin Conference
in January 1954. Its twin objectives were to unite Germany
in freedom and at the same time convince the Soviet Union
that it had nothing to fear from such a dev·elopment. In
addition to stipulating the conditions under which free
elections should be held to establish a government of a
united Germany, the plan also suggested that as evidence
of good intentions there should be a zone of inspection
and control comprising areas of comparable size and depth
on both sides of the demarcation li§e between.r�unified
Germany and her eastern neighbors."
In 1955, Sir Anthony added the concept of a zone of 'withdrawal by
both sides.

The original zone of inspection was expanded to in

clude the withdrawal of forces,.leaving a rather narrow demili�
tarized strip between the two blocs on either side of the Iron
Curtain.

The plan also included inspection of the buffer area,

limitations on armaments in areas of Europe, and a security pact
1O
between East and West.
Both the United States and Russia were
willing to consider the proposal, but each favored different
elements in the plan, as might be expected.

The Eden plan was

relegated to the background of the conference, however, after
Eisenhower's plans for total, world-wide d�sarmament were pre
sented to the conference.

"Open-Skies", as it was called, was

a grand plan for complete disarmament to be inspected both by
91'Macmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons','·'
� York Times, May 1, 1957, p. 6.
10sir Anthony Eden,� Circle, P• 325.

16
ground control posts and by aerial inspection of each other's
territory; including the e:x:.ohange of strategic blueprints.
The October Conference of Foreign Ministers was unable to
reach a decision on any of the proposals; but the fact that meetings
were taking place gave rise to the "Spirit of Geneva", a feeling
that men could work their problems out at the conference table
rather than by mutual destruction.

The hope seemed to have been

erected on little more than the desire for such hope.
West, after the Geneva meetings, were still far apart.

East and
The same

procedural problem remained even for Eden's plan which had been
altered prior to the October meetings in that German reunification
11
was made the first step of his proposal.
Both East and West
remained rather inflexible, and the build-up of arms and the
Very little had been ac

testing of nuclear weapons continued.

complished at Geneva; and yet, as Harvard's Dr. Berman pointed
out, the door seemed open �or
�
further negot·iat·ion.

12

On November 17, 1956, Bulganin sent a comprehensive disarmament
proposal to Great Britain, France, India, and the United States.
The disarmament door did seem to be still open.

Bulganin pro-

posed ... a world-wide reduction in armed forces Yd th a corresponding
reduction in armaments, a total ban on the use and production of
11
"Eden Plan for Garman Reunification,"� York Times,
September 27, 1955, p. 12.

a

12
Harold Berman's reply to
Subcommittee questionaire,
quoted in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Disarmament, Control� Reduction 2.1_ Armaments, Report 2501,
p. 375.
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nuclear weapons, the destruction of existing stockpiles, a re
duction of forces stationed in Central Europe and a removal of all
forces stationed on foreign soil within two years, reduction in
armament expenditures, a ban on nuclear weapons in foreign states,
internat'ional inspection and control, and a zone of aerial inspec
tion 800 kilometers on either side of the demarcation·line between
13
East and West.
The West seemed to be cautiously intrigued at
first, but after a short time all of the objections were solidi
fied under a "threat to NATO" concept which overshadowed the :parts
of the Bulganin proposals that seemed acceptable.14
Evidently the Russian leaders were interested in the dis
engagement parts of the Eden plan. This became a strong element
in their proposals in 1957, but the Soviet Union was proposing
withdrawal of forces from the demarcation line between East and
West Germany; whereas Eden had suggested the withdrawal of forces
from the border between reunified Germany and its eastern neighbors.
This is why Konrad Adenauer could agree to disengagement in 1955,
but disagree emphatically in 1957.15
On

April 20,- 1957, Bulganin tried again with a simpler plan.

First, a temporary ban on testing; second, a non-aggression pact
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; third, the conclusion

13 C.L. Sulzberger, "The Bulganin Proposals;'' � .!.2E1s Times,

November 18, 1956, :p. 33.
14
11Adenauer Sees Merit in Russian Proposals," New York
Times, January 12, 1957, pp. 1, 9. ".Adenauer Replies to U.S.---:
Criticism," ��Times, January 13, 1957, pp. 8, 40.
l5
Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p. 325.
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of an all European collective security pact; fourth,. discussion of
the Eden plan for demilitarization and partially armed areas; and
fifth, serious consideration of other Soviet disarmament ideas.16
The timing of this proposal suggests the probability that the
Soviet leaders were concerned about the nuclear rearming of West
Germany; a question to be discussed at the May NATO Conference
Bonn.

in

Whatever the motivation, the proposal stirred up a variety

of reactions.

Harold Stassen, attending the London Disarmament

Conference, seemed interested, but when he expressed his interest
some Western leaders were dismayed.17 Eisenhower replied to a news
conference question that the Bulganin proposal deserved serious
study in regard to the Eden ideas, and that "•••I personally
believe that••. mutual inspection is going to come about through
some such evolutionary develo�ment that is envisaged in that kind
of proposal."18 Leaders in West Germany saw this answer as
hedging over a proposal th�t would tend to perpetuate the division
of Germany.

When Washington seemed interested in the zone of

aerial inspection and arms reduction in Central Europe, West
Germany thought that the official sources quoted were referring to
demilitarized areas, and they were very critical.

Washington

denied favorable consideration of areas of demilitarization and
1611The

New :Bulganin Proposal�" New York Times, April 25,

1957, p. 1.
17Jerome Spingarn, "Five Months in London," Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, September 1957, p. 258.

18
"Text of Eisenhower News Conference� 11
May 9, 1957, p. 18.

� �

Times,

blamed the whole misunderstanding on Harold Stassen, chief U.S.

1
disarmament negotiator. 9

19

Secretary of State )}ulles began, under

standably, to feel that Central Europe had too many political
complications, and that a more politically barren area should be
the f.irst step for a zone of inspec
.
t·ion.

20

·
es
�-� '• 1 y,--- Ifull
A ccor'-W,,;pg

later flew to London, the site of the Conference. on Disarmament,
and proposed a possible Arctic inspection zone including parts of

the United Sta�es, Norway, and Russia.21 This got nowhere, mainly
because Russia refused.

The Soviet Union also rejected a

twenty-four nation proposal at the United N�tions that would have
progressively reduced a;rmaments and armed forces with both air and
ground inspection, even though the proposal was passed by the
General Assembly.22

Disarmament talks continued-but nobody disarmed.

The

hard line on both sides of the Iron Curtain held fast. As one
writer put it:

"For more than a year now the contending parties

have been more concerned with twisting arms than with reducing
them.11�3

Each side was afraid to stop testing and developing nuclear

weapons for reasons of their own security.

If there was to be

19"Eisenhower on Troop Reduction," � �Times,
May 12, 1957, p. 1.
20 "U.S. Concerned about Troop Cuts·,'1 ��Times,

May 30, 1957, P• l.
21 1A m -1 r s Putting the Chips Down, 11 Newsweek, Vol. 50,
August 12, 1957, P• 38.
22 1Th.
1 e Partial Measures Approach to Disarmament, 11 United
Nations Review, Vol. 4, December 1957, p. 4.
p. 481.

23
11Twisting A:rms,u Economist, Vol. 189, February 22, 1958,
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any progress at all in this Spirit of Geneva, a first step was
needed, particularly in Central Europe.

As a writer in Nation

put it, there seemed to be no sense in a "foolproof inspection
of polar bears, while Europe, which both sides have packed to
overflo�ing with military installations and troops, would be ig

nored.11 24 Harold Stassen sought a rather large ·first step when

he pro·posed a two year mora,torium on tests and the production of
nuclear devices, an eriforci-ble: _system- of, in§Jpectiol;l and an initial
reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.25 Premier
Khrushchev suggested on a taped Face �Nation interview that
both sides withdraw their troops from foreign bases.

26

United

States officials did not like this kind of a first step, however.
A few days later Senator Knowland (R - California) suggested

that

Norway be neutralized in exchange for the neutralization of the...
2
country, Hungary. 7

Warsaw Pact

This proposal was rapidly re

jected by Norway, Hungary, Dulles, 1n

the�� T imes edi-

torial staff; 28 even though Knowland was advocating free elections
in Hungary only a year after the bloody revolution was crushed by
the armed might of the Soviet Union, and feeling about Hungary was

p. 4 89.

p. 38.

24
11The First Little Steps," Nation 1 Vol. 184, June

8, l.957,

25 11 .An
swer--A-Blast," Nevrsweek, Vol. 50, September 12,

1957,

26

1957, p. 6.

11Te:x:t of Khrushchev's Rem.arks'," New York Times, June 3,

27 1
1

Knowland's Plan·� n �� Times, J e 10,

1957, :P• 1.

281
1Norway Irked by Neutrality Plan·," New York Times,
June 11, 1957, pp. 5, 34; "Dulles Against Knowland Plan,"�
Ibid.,
-,
June 12, 195 7, p. 12; "Hungary Dismisses Knowland: Plan·, 11
June 15, 1957, P• 4.
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still very much in favor of doing something to alter the situation.29
Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party, sought the
first step in a proposal that was specifically Central European.
His plan included the removal of all foreign forces from East
and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; international
control over the national forces that would remain; the reunific�
tion of Germany; a security pact guaranteeing European borders;
and the removal of Germany and the three satellites from their
0
respective alliances in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.3 Mr .
Gaitskill was quoted as saying that he would much rather test the
Russians than go on testing bombs.31 His ideas were not championed
by the Conservative Government nor by the.West generally; but
they did stir up interest and discussion.
Another man that created discussion in early 1957 was George
F. Kennan, the Mr. X of the containment policy. He testified be
fore the Disarmament ·Subcommittee on January 9, 1957, making
suggestions similar to those of Gaitskill.
"I have never felt that there was any great possibility
of arriving at any multilateral agreement for reduction
of armaments, so long as you (sic) had Americaj2and Soviet
forces face- to face in the middle of Germany. 11
2911Knowland's Plan," ��Times, June 10, 1957, p. 1.
30Hugh. Gaitsk.ill� .Adlai,· Stevenson,: Pierre Mendes France,·.
"Three OpJJosi tion Leaders Discuss Russia a.nd the West," New Republic,
Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 12.
3111Gaitskill's Plan," New�Times, June 17, 1957, P• 4.
32u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Disarmament, Control� Reduction .2f_Armaments (hearings), Part
Two, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 9, 10, 1957, p. 1003.
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The next question concerned .NATO ,- in which Germany wa.s by now a
prominent member.

Senator Symington (D - Mississippi) asked:

" ••• would you be willing to scrap NATO in order to have our troops
out of Western Germany and Russian troops out of Poland or East
Ge:rmany? 1133

Kennan replied:

"I an inclined to think.that the dan

gers might be less by not ha:y,ing Germany in NATO, if· the Soviet·s

4
would really get out of Eastern Europe.11 3

Kennan's ideas received world wide attention in late 195 7 when
he delivered the Reith Lectures35 over the British Broadcasting
Company facilities.
November 24, 1957.

The lectur� on Central Europe was given on
The main element in his prescriptive remarks

was disengagement, or the pulling back of opposed forces leaving
Thia was

a buffer area in between.

ot a reversal of his contain

ment article ten years earlier, but rather an adjunct to that
policy.

It represented an answer to the question implicit in

containment:
6

op.inions3

Now what?

Kennan's answer reflecte

many expert

that Soviet withdrawal could not be expected without

some sort of negotiated quid pro quo agreement between the two
powers.

The rigid policies of the United States and the Western

nations, :Mr. Kennan said, generally ask Moscow to abandon
"the military and political bastion in Central Europe
which it won by its military effort from 1941-1945,
33Ibid., p. 101 .
3

·34Ibid.

35These lectures are now a Harper & Eros.publication,
Russia,.��� lli West, (New York: Harper & Eros, 1957)

3 6u.s. Senato Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 25 01, p. 11 •
.

. :·�· , . .

-

-
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and to do this without any compensatory withdrawal of 7
American armed power from the heart of the Continent." 3 I
it is
11 I think we are justified in assuming tha
this question of the indefinate retention of the American
and other Western garrisons on a
soil which lies at
the heart of the difficulty •••• "3
"It j�signs half of
Europe, by implication, to the Russians.

eman

In that other half, he continues, it is the retention of Soviet
troops that prevents the evolution of the satellites to insti-.

·

tutions and social systems most suited to their needs.40

There�

fore, what more logical solution than reciprocal withdrawal?

In

regard to West Germany's part in NATO, Mr. Kennan said:
"I would only say that it seems to me far more desirable 6n principle to get the Soviet forces out of Central
and Eastern Europe than to cultivate a new German army
1
for the purpose of opposing them while they remain there." 4
Kennan's ideas were accepted by a great many people, but on the
official level they were rejected by the Western powers.

The

interesting part of the matter was that increasingly both sides
were suggesting the same thing: some sort of zonal area in v,hich
a beginning might be made to make Europe more secure by the reduc
tion of arms and forces.

However, progress was not being made.

Would a more modest proposal be accepted?

Evidently reduction in

conventional armed forces and in conventional arms faced certain
opposition--but what about-a proposal to ban just nuclear weapons,
and in just a small area?
probably asked.

37 George

_____

F. Kennan, Russia., the Atom and the West, P• 38.

38Ibid., p.
41.
39Ibid., p. 0.

4

4oibid., p. 36.
41Ibid.,

This was a question Adam Rapacki

P• 45

TI:IE PROPOSAL ITSELF
Adam Rapacki has been Foreign Minister of Poland since
Gomulka came back to power in

1956, during the Polish October.

As Foreign Minister Rapacki is the official head of the Polish
delegation to the United Nations.

It was here that his proposal

was initially made, in a speech before the General Assembly, on
October 2,

1957.

"The special responsibility of the great powers as
stressed by the United Nations Charter, by no means limits
the responsibility or the part to be played by the small
states. Poland will make its contribution.
"Poland.is a socialist country and is therefore able
to overcome the consequences of its age-long backwardness
and insure its growth in all fields. It can also be a
positive factor in the peaceful development of relations
among: states.
"Strong and stable ties of solidarity, springing from
mutual needs and common basic problems, link it with other
socialist countries, but it wishes to maintain at the same
time the friendliest relations with other states. There
cannot be any contradiction in this regard, for this is the
esssnce of constructive peaceful coexistence.
"Poland has embarked on a great effort to reorganize
its forms and methods of government and its economic
administration. Favorable :pros:�1ects, however, are linked
with �he progress of the international situation.
"At this session of the Assembly, attempts should be
made to reach mutual understanding on controversial issues,
or at least partial solutions.
"Disarmament is the key problem. The first obstacle
which the Disarmament Subcommittee proved unable· to over
come and the main reason for its lack of success was the
concept of the so-called "global strategy" of·the Western
powers in which so vital a role is played by nuclear
weapons.
"Another was that the Western powers made concrete
steps toward disarmament conditional upon the simultaneous
solution of other controversial international problems.
And the third obstacle arose from the opposition of the
German Federal Republic and from considerations concerning
the remilitarization of Western Germany.
24

25
"Time is running short. Every month of the armaments
race imposes on humanity an increasing burden. The armed
forces of the great powers are being speedily re-equipped with
nuclear weapons, and the danger of the armies of an in
creasing number of states being equipped with such weapons is
growing. The danger of weapons of mass destruction being
used even in local conflicts will soon become imminent.
"Therefore, if an agreement on a final and complete
ban on nticlear weapons is not possible at present, the
Soviet proposal for a pledge by great powers not to use
such weapons for at least five years is an appropriate
initial step. Poland also supports every initiative which
will lead,, in the shortest possible time, to the cessation
of nuclear tests.
"The remilitarization of the German Federal Republic
and the concentration of arms and troops there are dangerous
to the cause of peace in Europe and in the whole world.The rightful aspirations of the German people toward
nation�l unity are in the good interests of Europe, but
the process of reunification can develop favorably only in
an atomosphere of relaxation of international tension, dis
armament, and a growing sense of security on the part of
Germany'e neighbors, only by rapprochment and understanding
by the two German states.
"The existing tension is 0 eing intensified by revisionist
claims concerning Poland*s western frontier, a frontier which
is final, inviolable and not subject to any bargaining.
"Poland is against the division of Europe into opposing
blocs and military pacts, but in view of tne danger which
West German rearmament within NATO poses, Poland and its
allies had to conclude the Warsaw Pact, which safeguards
security until an effective system of collective security is
set up to replace the existing division of Europe. Poland
supports even partial measures leading toward that ultimate
objective. That is why the setting up of a zone of limited
and controlled armaments in Europe would serve a useful.
purpose.
"In the interest of Poland's security and of European
detente, and after consultation on this initiative with
other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the
Polish People's Republic declares that, should the two
German states express their consent to putting into effect
the prohibition of production and stockpiling of atomic.and
thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish
People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to take the
same action on her own territory.
"Should this initiative be adopted, it would be at
least an initial step forward on a matter of paramount
importance not only to the Polish nation and to -the German
people, to their good mutual relations, but also useful

26
to Europe and to all nations.11

1

The remainder of his address dealt with related matters such as
the reduction of tension in tha Middle East, and the improving
of trade relations between East and West.
Immediately after Adam Rapacki's speech, Vaclav David, of
Czechoslovakia, made the following speech of affirmation.
"In the interests of reducing international tension,
Czechoslovakia is prepared to associate itself v.rith the
proposals of Poland and to assume an obligation to re
nounce the producti0n and stationing of atomic weapons on
its territory if both German states come to an agreement
for the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of
atomic weapons on the territory of Germany, as was pro
posed by the German Democratic Republic.
"The readiness of Poland and Czechoslovakia to assume
these obligations can make it easier to reach such an
agreement which would, no doubt, constitute a step forward
in solving the problems of peace and of European security.
At the same time it would help considerably in improving
the international atomosphere �d reaching agreement on
further disarmament measures."

--

Tha two speeches were summarized by the New York Times-as
United Nations news.

It was a brief summary on page four, and the

reporter concluded with the observation that Rapacki had not
mentioned any provision for control and inspection if the proposal
were accepted by West Germany.3

Rapacki does speak of controlled

armaments but not the control of the reduction nor the inspection.

1"Summary of the Debate, U.N. General Assembly," United
Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, pp. 84-85.
2
Ibid., p. 85.
311Rapacki and David Pledge Disarming;" � York Times,
October 3, 1957, p. 4.
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of the control.

Rapacki replied to this objection in a speech

before the Sejm (Polish Parliment) Foreign Affairs Committee on
December 13, 1957.

He said that Poland was greatly interested

in a most effective control to provide maximum security for all the
interested states.

But ha would rather work out the control and

inspection aspects of his proposal after there was agreement on

the principle itself.4 As far as Rapacki was concerned at year's
end, matters of control could be worked out.
The

timing of the proposal was, as mentioned above in connec

tion with ::Bulganin's proposals, connected with the December meeting
of NATO to be held in Paris.

Already during the May meeting in

Bonn the United States had expressed its desire to station nuclear
weapons on the territory of its allies.

The matter had been

postponed until December and the issue was pending. The United
States made it quite clear

in

the· intervening months that as soon

as intermediate range missiles and their warheads could be mass
produced, it would like to see them distributed among the NATO
allies.

The

primacy of this issue in terms of the denucleariza

tion proposal is clearly visible in the remarks Rapacki Lade before
the Sejm,5

and this in turn is based on an apparently real fear

of Germany which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

However, the

Rapacki proposals did not get much attention from October to
4Adam Rapacki, 11 Poland's Active, Constructive and Peace
ful Foreign Policy," Polish Facts� Figures, No. 584, December 21
1957, p. 3.
5Ibid., pp. 1, 2.
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December.

Therefore, in the week preceding the Paris meetings,

M. Rapacki quietly called in the diplomatic representatives
of a number of Western countries, including the United
States, expressed Poland's grave concern over the possi
bility �f West Germany's receiving missiles, a�d urged re
consideration of his United Nations proposal."
11

Similar motivation was apparently felt by Soviet Premier
Bulganin.

On Pecember 10, 1957, he wrote to Eisenhower urging

the acceptance of peaceful coexistence. The letter attempted
to be a calm, objective approach to the problem.

Bulganin urged

Eisenhower not to put nuclear weapons in West Germany; to con
sider the merits of the Rapacki Plan, and to join him in a declara
tion against the use of nuclear weapons and

in

a non-aggression

pact.7 Eisenhower replied that the proposals did not meet the
heart of the problem which was the mounting production of new
nuclear weapons.

Besides, he said, of what value is the Rapacki

· ·1es.?
Plan in
. view
.
of 1ong-range m1ss1

8

The Soviet leader also

wrote to the Bonn Government on December 11th.

In this letter

he urged an immediate freeze on armament levels, troop withdrawal
or disengagement in Central Europe, the Rapacki Pla , and the
9
signing of a non-aggression pact.
Only seventeen days after George F. Kennan's lecture on BBC,
6sidr,ley Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan," � � Times,
January 6, 1958, P• 12.

711Bulganin's December 10th Letter- to Eisenhower," l!.:..§..:_
Department 21_ State Bulletin, Vol. 38, January 27, 1958, pp. 127-130.
8Ibid., pp. 124-125.
911Text of Bulganin's Proposal to West Gel'I!lany," � �
Times, December 12, 1957, P• 4.
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the Soviet Premier had ideas of disengagement linked to the pro
posals of Adam Rapacki; as well as great power declarations of
peaceful intent.

The main motiv�tion for this evolution of Soviet

policy seems 1to have been the approaching Paris meeting.

The

January 6, 1958 issue of the�Republic stated that there were
10
tw.o unseen guests at the Paris meetings; Kennan and Bulganin.
They might well have added Adam Rapacki.
The December meetings did not reach complete accord in regard
to nuclear weapons in Europe; but enough agreements had been made
that Eisenhower suggested to Congress that the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 be amended so that nuclear weapons could be supplied to
The result was Public Law No. 85-479,
11
Eisenhower referred
85th Congress, 2nd Session (July 2, 1958).

allies of the United States.

to this authority on May 26, 1959 in a message to Congress in which
he specifically asked authority to supply West Germany, Turkey,
and the Netherlands with nucle�r weapons.

12

But this was not yet

a� accompli in early 1958, and Bulganin sought to maintain the
pressure on the West by suggesting a chief of state's meeting with
an agenda cleared of controversial matters.

His agenda included

tests suspension, renunciation of nuclear weapons, the Rapacki Plan,
10

1958, p. 3.
11

"Kennan's Advice," �Republic, Vol. 138, January 6,

nAtomic Data Exchange," Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, Vol. 14, 1958, pp. 62-63.
12
�., Vol. 15, 1959, pp. 104-105.
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non-aggression pacts, conventional force reduction with inspection,
and the extension of the nuclear-free zone to Scandanavia and
1
Italy. 3 Dulles replied that the nuclear-free zone would lead to
the total neutralization of the area, and he stressed the primacy
of German reunification by free elections, and freedom for Eastern
1
Europe. 4
The Rapacki Plan vras also used by .Bulganin in other proposals,
leading some observers to conclude that the Plan was in essence
a Soviet concept.

Since, however, Rapacki states in his United

Nations speech that he made the initiative only afte� consultation
with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the question of its
real authorship serves no real purpose.

However this may be, the

Plan was still only a paragraph in a speech.

As C. L. Sulzberger
15
editorialized, the Plan needed more elaboration.
Rapacki provided that elaboration on February 14th, 1958,

.
when he handed United States
Ambassador Beam a Note and Memorandum16
in which the original proposal was e:x:panded to answer questions · •:
raised against it.

The area involved was the same; viz., West and

East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The states agreeing

to the proposal obligated themselves not to produce nor to import
13

11Text of Bulganin's Proposal, 11 ��Times,
January 10, 1951::S, p. 4; "Bulganin Would Extend Nuclear Free Zone,"
Ibid., January 12, 1958, p. 1.
14
11Text of Dulles Speech," � � Times, January 11,
1958, p. 6.
15

c. L. Sulzberger, "Disengagement, What it Means,"
� York Times, editorial, February 5, 1958, p. 26.

16complete text of the Note and Memorandum in Appendix A.
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nuclear weapons of any kind, nor allow them on their territory.
The four states bind themselves not to maintain nuclear weqpons
in the armaments of their forces in the area, nor service in
stallations, nor missile launching equipment; and not to transfer
such to another government or persons in the area.

Other states

having forces.in the area undertake similar obligations.

Those

states possessing nuclear weapons pledge themselves not to use
those weapons against the zone.
Rapacki received Soviet approval for his inspection pro

1
visions on the 28th of Ja.nuary. 7

As a matter of fac�, Khrushchev

stated in Die� that the nsoviet Union was ready to give re
liable international guarantees for such a zone and believed a·
broad form of control was possible.11

18

Rapacki, therefore, sug

gested both ground obssrver posts manned by members or both blocs
and aerial inspection of th

territory involved.

The means of agreeing to such a proposal could be by inter
national convention or by unilateral declaration of the states
This second method would avoid West Ger any's reluc

concerned.

tance to do anything implying recognition of East Germany.

The

1
Memorandum 9 concluded with a plea for favorable consideration;
since it could be a step towards facilitation of agreements in
regard to the reduction in conventional arms and foreign armies
17

11Russia .4.pproves Polish Controls, n ��Times,
January 29, 1958, P• 1.
1 8 "Khrushchev Pushes Zone,"� York Times, February

1958, p. 5.

7,

19
The Memorandum was also sent to Great Britain, France,
Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Russia, East
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and India.
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within the zone.
The proposal as summarized here was not the final form of the
Rapacki Plan.

It was, nonetheless, the best expression of the

1957-1958 Rapacki concept of control and the limitation of arms
in a specified area.

The reduction in conventional armaments and.

armed forces was not a part of the proposal, at this :point in time.
In regard to these ideas, Rapacki said that he welcomed a revival
of discussion concerning those concepts, but they had previously
aroused too much opposition.

"That wa.s why, among other reasons,

we put forward a more modest proposal, but a simpler and more
practical one."

20

He did not wish the nuclear free zone agree

ments to be conditioned by necessary agreement to any other problem.
He sought a simple step, a basis for negotiation that could accom
plish something desirable: a step away from the bloc confrontation
in Central Europe, the stalemated disarmament talks and the resultant arms race; and a step a ay from the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
"In this way we want to take part in the struggle of all
countries and forces of socialism and progress for the detente
in international relations, for peaceful coexistence, for21
disarmament and collective security for a lasting peace."
20

Adam Rapacki, "Poland's Active, Constructive and
Peaceful Foreign Policy, 11 Polish Facts and Figures, No. 584,
December 21, 1957, p. 3.
21

Ibid.

TEE PIVOTAL ROLE OF WEST GERMANY
There is no doubt that the Ra:pa.cld. Plan is intricately bound up in
what had come to be knovm as the German question. The task of this chap
ter is to trace the development of the German situation; first to attempt
to show that a fea.r of Germany was the prime motivation for the Rapacki
Plan; and second to attempt to traoe the importance of West Germany in
te:rms of the acceptance or rejection of the Plan by the Western po'W8rs.
The European phase of the war had ended with the unconditional
surrender of the German nation. Allied land forces had simultaneously
pushed the Gennan armies from the F.ast and the West. When Russian sol
diers neared .American troops in Germany, the wa.r had ended for all prac
tical purposes. Germany lay in economic and political ruin. As the
dust of the war settled t·e four victors divided Germany into occupa
tion zones both to prevent the resurgence of Nazism and to begin a.
limited effort to rebuild the desolated country.
• ll Russia. and the i'i7i3st developed
The conflict of interests be-twee

into the Cold W

--

which had a prof.ound effect o0. Germany- e T'ne ori

gional wa.rtime policy of stripping G�,.,,.,,,...� of industrial ase · s so as
to reduca i ts productivity was gracb..! · ly reversed by the West" By

1946 the Western occupation authorities felt that zonal economi o pro
grams • re futile, and in October of 1946 the British and .American
zones were merged economically, and

re joined somewhat later by the

French. By 1948, the original attitude was so reversed that the
United States included West Germany in the Marshall Plan. T'.o.ia re
sulted in Soviet reorganization of East Germany's economy and aid in

:.3'3
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the fo:rm of long term credits on the foreign exohange •
.As the West's apprehension of Russia increased, the fea:r of Ger
many decreased.

The economic union of West Germany was aJ.lowed to evolve

into the political union of the three Western sectors. The desire to re
habilitate West Ge� was very strong, and accordingly a constitutional
convention met in Bonn under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer. The
Social Democrats at first opposed this because they feared political sov
ereignty would perpetuate the division of Germany. But the convention
drafted the Basic Law with .Allied help, and it was proclaimed on� 23,
1949 even th01.1gh Germcwy remained under Occupational Statute until 1951.

The Basic Law merged the three zones into the German Federal Re:publio.
The Soviet Union followed this 'Wi. th the establishment of the German

Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949• Both West and East tied their
respective areas to themselvea both politically and economically. East
a.nd Wist Germ.any became really separ

•

1
The victor's garr·sons,
however, W3re not removed. The ostensible

· re ason for the continuation of the :pr sence of ax1ted forces was protection.

Western troops :prote cta d West Germany and

P.:tt~
. sian forces

East Germany. The German State b3came tl:us not an area of oocu:pa.
h victors. lTo't'Jhere else in
tion but a potential battle ound for te

the vrorld

the confrontation so int9 nse and eo filled w.lth tension.

No matter what else was problematic in regard to
of Ge a:ny overshadowed it.

, ope, the problem

The German problem beoams the

· gle great

est obstacle to the solution of Central Europe's :problems. As George F.
Kennan said, any Central European solut�on that did not correct the
German situation was not a solution; a solution in Germany was the key
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to the whole Central European dilermna.

But therein ley the rub. kny

change in the situation, seemed to imply either war or retreat; so that
the question of where does one go from here remained unanswered.

Germany, a.s a burning issue in Central European politics had two
main facets in te:rms of the Rapacki Plan. In the first place, Germa.ey
was the main motivation for the proposal; and secondly, Germany was a

major factor in the Western rejection of the proposal. The ability of
Germany, in particular West Germany, to so affect both

s an index of

her importance not only in Central Europe but throughout the world.

The Polish people have a deep-seated fear and distrust of Germa.ny;
and, particularly since the Cold War, a fear of West Germaey.

Whether

this fear, which is apparently a viabl thing, is manipulated by the
Polish Government is a speculative qu

tio •

The fact is that there

are at least two bases for it.
First, the German oooupation of Poland du:ring the war would have

created fear in almost any poople. n

bestiality of' the German oc-

cupa.tion assumed unparalleled proporti ns."2 ''Millions died before fir
ing squads and in concentration camps.

re deliber

Those left alive

ately condem.."led o undernourislrnent and starvation.113 \7i 11 over three
million Polish Jews, and over three million Polish non-J ws were exte

ina.ted by the German occupational foroe s.4

It would s-

country suffered so ruinous an occupation as did Poland.

that no

C ncentration

1George F. Kennan, Russ114,, -� Atan and� West, P• 36.
2

Clifford R. Barnett, Pol _!!a,, Its People lE!, Society1 .!l!,
Cv.lture., ( ew York: Grove Presa, Inc., 'i958), P• 's"•
3Ibid., p. 23.
411Poland," Encyolo:pedi! Americana._, (New York:
Corporation, 1956), Vol. 22, P• 287.

American
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camps 9 such as .Ausch,ri.tz, forced labor, a massive uprooting of people
in an atmosphere of inh.umani ty lead one to conclude that the Ge:rmana
ware bent on the complete extermination of the Polish nation.
In the second place, the fear of West Germany sprang out of con
cern over

the

question of the Western boundaries of Poland. This ques

tion is bound up with the war and the eventual defeat of Germany.
Winston Churchill, at the Teharan Conference in late 1943, proposed that
the 1941 Curzon line on Poland's ea.stern border

be

a.greed to, and Poland

would then be compensated for the loss of this territory to Russia by
receiving territory from Ge:rtnalJY• Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin
a.greed to this in :principle. At Yalta, however, the Soviets were anx
ious to preserve their military gains. This was in

February

of 1945•

Russia wanted the city of Konigsb rg, and wanted the compensation from
Germany to Poland to extend all the wa;r west to the Oder and Neisse
Rivers. Roosevelt seemed indifferent to this5 but Churohill felt that
this was too much territory. So the question went unresolved. Be
tween Yalta

d Potsdam (July-August 1945) the Sovi t Unio. made

uni

lateral arrangements with Polan wherein Russia. simply granted the ter
ritory to Poland vtlthout consultation with the other Allies. At the
Potsdam Conference an attempt

\'VB.S

made to push the Polish nation ba.ok

in an eastward direction but no agreement could be reached. There
fore, the final .Agreement stat s:

5

Victor s. Mama.tey, Soviet Russian J°!nperialism, (New York:
Van ostrand Co., 1964), P• 67.

"Tha three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that
the final delimitation of the western :f'rontier of Poland
should await the peace settlement.
"The three Heads of Gover-.ament agree that, pending the
final determination of Poland's western frontier, the for
mer German territories east of a. line running from the
:Baltic Sea immediately west of s,nnemund.e, and thence a.long
the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River
and a.long the western Neisse to the Czechoslovakian frontier,
including that portion of East Prussia. not placed under the
administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in accordance with the understanding reached at this confer
ence and including the area of the former free city of
Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish
· State and for such purposes should not be considered
part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany •••• t,
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Thus this valuable territory from Pola.11d • s point of view has never been
a matter of international agreement up to the present day. 'Ihe Soviet
Union, of' course, recognized the Odez--Neisse line. The Ea.st Genna.n
Government in the Zgorzelec .Agreement of 1950 did a.lso. 7. But very
definitely not Wast Germany.
The Polish acquisition of this t rritory forced many millions of
Germans to leave. The same evacuation occurred in regard to Sudetenland
which was returned to Czechoslovakia. Most of these refu es ended up
in ' st Ge:rman;r but they -ware not hapl ,y there: " •••mil.l i :os of refugees have their eyes fixed towards the east. Many of them

ree.d;y'

for a new war if tha. is the nly wa;y they can regain their ol homea. 118

Ev;

J

ry waek another thousand of these people crossed the borders. By
ary;.�, 1950, there
6

re well over nine million r fu.gees in West
•

-

Ibi,d9', :PP• 144-145• (His appendix contains e...cerpts of' the
official document.)

7w. Gomulka., "Tha Polish People I s Republic, tt Forei&!! Affairs_,
April, 1960, P• 143•
8Ec1gar Sa1in, "Social Forces in Germany Today," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 28, January, 1950, P• 275.

Vol.
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Germany, over a fifth of the total population. 9 Thia high'a percentage
suggests that the refugees strongly affected national policy in areas
of concern to them, and that the Adenauer refusal to recognize the

Ode�feisse line was strongly conditioned by the presence of the ref'ugees.10
The arming of Germans with nuclear weapons was a fea.r:f'ul thing to the
Poles. They fe8t,red the Germans because of occupation terror and the
threatened loss of the valuable industrial territory Poland had received;

While these weapons were in West German hands 1n 1959, with u.

s.

con

trol of nuolear warheads; 11 the Rapacki Plan in 1957-1958 is an under

standable Polish effort to forestall· this. Arthur Olsen, � � T:i.msa
correspond.ant 1n Poland, writing from W8:rsaw in 1962, stated that Polish
official sources there made no secret of the faot that the first objec
tive of the Rapacki Plan was to forestall t e acquisition of nuclear
v,

apons by West Germany•12

It is interesting, parenthetically, that the East German regime was
also very active in supper "', of the

:Pacld. Plan. The motivation was some

what similar in that their support of the proposal probably :reflected a.
fear for their own government if the West G rmans
lear a.ms.

re to

t a;ny rate, the effort as a strong one. Pr :i

given nuoGrotewobl

·X

9Ma.rion Donhoff, "Garmany Pu.ts Freedom Before Unity," Foreia_
Affair..., Vol. 28, April, 1950, P• 403.
10office of High Commissioner for Germ.a.ny,"Politica.l. Aspects
(' - --of the Refugee Probl , 11 Report � ---..1.
'"-T � No.4, July 1-September 30,
1950, PP• 30-34•
11Norman Thanas, "Support For Rapacki Plan," Letter, � �
T-l..mee, June 17, 1959, P• 34.
12.Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in u.s.Rejectio " New
� Times, April 8, 1 962, P• 19.
-;;;,;.
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broadcast a. radio speech into West Germany urging that all the German people be given the ri€ht to vote on the Rapacki issue.13

The East German

Con:mrunist Party went so far as to suggest that the West German Socialist
1
Party unite with them in a campaign for the nuclear-free zons.4
Thus, the West C-erman potent.:.al for aggression was a prim motivator
of the Rapacki· Plan.

But the West German State also plaJed a large role

in regard to the Western reaction to the proposal. As a matter of fact,
West Germany exercised a powarful influence over all disarmament pro
posals. At the .Bonn NATO Conference in Mley' of

1957,

Eisenhower had as

sured Adenauer:
11 ••• that

(1) the nation would make no disarmament agreement

which might prejudice later German reunification and (2) that

any comprehensive disarmament prof sal necessarily presupposed
solution of the German question." 5

Later in the year, this same viewpoint -was adopted by Brita.in and France.16
Ho

ver well this sounded, the results of such an attitude, as J.P.

Morrccy-, a spokesman for the .American left, points out ware that the Ger

man Chancellor had bee

accorded a veto on any com rehensive disa:rma

1
ment measure. 7 MorraJ fails to add, howaver, th t this veto.also went
the other way. . On page foor of the Bonn Agreements of 1952 as amended
by th-C Paris Protocol of

13

1954, o�e finds the statement that the three

"Text of Premier. Grot wohl I s Speech, 11
ary 23, 1958, P• 4•

� �

Ti.mes, Janu

1411East Germany Corresponds With "'lest Germany," New�
Times, December 26, 1957, P• 9.

1
5eecil
V. Crabb, Jr., A'llerica.n Foreign Poli2_ in the Nuclear
Aga, (Elmsford, New York: Row I' terso , 96
1 0}, P• 468. - 16Ibid.

(New York:

17J.P.Morrey,

�Yalta. .!2_ Disarmament:
IJ.a.r:per & Bros., 1961), P e 301.
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Western powers retained their full rights and responsibilities in West
Germa.ny in regard to matters affecting German reunification and a peace
settlement.18 Even though this veto want both Wccy"S, it may be suggested
that Konrad Adenauer would not be the first to propose greater flexibility
in dealing with the Soviet Union and her satellites. Adenauer firmly-

be

lieved that the future of Germany dep nded to a great extent on her orien
tation to the West. A developiDg prosperity and great possibilities in
herent in the oonQept of the Common Market would tend to confirm a de
cided reluctance to alter the course of events.
Another possible cause of Ad na.uer's inflexibility in regard to the
Rapacki Plan was the boundary dispute with Poland. Fram the Chancellor's
point of view there was no reason to a.gree to the creation of a zone such
as Rapacki suggested; certainly a. part of the treaty or declaration pro
hibiting nuclear weapons would describe the ex ot territory involved.
Such a description would tend to legalize the Oder-Neisse line and Po
land's sovereignty over the area Ea.st of the line; just a.sit would tend
to confirm the sovereignty of East Gema • Either of these would be opposed by the estern powars a.�y; but it woul probably also have been
politically unhealthy for Adenauer to even apparently recognize these
borders, because of the preponderance of refugee voterso _4;rnold Heiden
heim r suggested that betv;een elections the Chancellor was largely in
sensitive to the desires manifested in public opinion,19 but it must be
18

u. s. Senate, Connnittee on Foreign Relations, Rea.rings on the
.2!!. � Termination .2! � Occupation R_ep.me .!!!. �Federal�
J?P:_blic g: (!e:rma ;Y:, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Ma.re 29, 1955. ( 7ashing
ton: Government Printing Office, 1955), P• 26.
Protocol

York:

19.Arnold J. Heiclanheimer, The Governments
Thomas Crowell Co., 1961) P• 220.

.2! G,erman,v,
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_remembered th.at Adenauer first got the Chancellorship by only one vote;
and the independent parties that formed pa.rt of his several coalitions
were often supported by refugee groups• Even a.f'ter the refugees formed
their own party, the Ex:pellees party (BHE), many still voted for inde
pendent groups. This was a povrorful factor in the 1950-1960 German
:political situation. Even though the five per cent·cla.u.se 20 of the
:Basic Law kept them from exercising too much power, by 1960 the retu
gae population exceeded thirteen million, or one-fourth of the total
population of West Germa.ey.21
Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that Adenauer's in
flexibility was occasioned by his lack of desire for reunification.
One such is Nonnan Thomas, .American Socialist leader, who maintained
that Adenauer went along with the West on reunification only a.s an
issue, not as reality. In other vmrds, Thomas charged that Adenauer
thought first of the political benefits from the division and sec
ondly of' Germimy or German wel:fa.ree Mr. Thomas states that Adenauer
was opposed to Geman reunification b9oause:
20This cl�se of the Basic Law reduced the number of splin�r
parties by maintaining that parties failing to receive 5fo of the total
feder�l. second ballot vote, or which fail to elect 3 deputies in direct
constituency seats cannot share in the distribution of seats on a pro
portional basis.
21Flora Lewis, "The Un.stable States of Germany," Foreiffi M.,
fairs, Vol. 38, July, 1960, PP• 588-597. For additional information on
the refugee's political impact see also James Pollock, "The Electoral.
System of the Federal Republic of Germany," APSR, Vol. 46, December,
1952, PP• 1056-1068; Otto Kircheimer and Arnold Price, "Analysis and
Effects of the Elections in Western Germany," �pa.rtment of State
Bulletinv Vol. 21, October 17, 1949, PP• 563-573; and Peter Merkl,
� Rrigin .2!, the� German Republic, (New York: Oxford Univer· .
sity Press, 19b3).
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"He did not want an accession of Protestant and Socialist
strength in his Republio. His refusal to abandon claim to
what vras German territory ea.st of the Oder-Neisse lines be
fore 1945 is evidence of' his desire for an issue rather than
its solution. Poland will not give up that territory with
out war; its German inhabitants a.re mostly wall resettled
in West Germany, and the Gennan threat forces a som�Ft
reluctant Poland into the arms of the Russian bear.
Whatever the reason for his lack ot flexibility, Adenauer pos
sessed a major role in the formation of' Western polio;r with regard to

Central Europe. He used his veto power often, and a.lweys with suocess.23
He seemingly could not agree to any proposal adversely af'feoting the
strength of West Ge:rmany or its basic orientation to the West.
As late a.s 1963, the role of West Germany was seen by West Germans
at least a.s no less pOW8r:f\ll. than it had been. In regard to the test ba.n
treaty during the Kenne� Administration, the West Germans were very un
happy that they had not been shown the tr a.ty before it was initialed in
Moscow. Before West Ge:rma.ny would adhere to the treaty, they asked that
the Western Allies pranise that a:ny future proposals that came

up

for

negotiation with the Soviet Union be sul:mitted to West Germany for
scrutiny prior to acceptance.24
In terms of disa.:rmament proppsals affecting Central Europe, the West
was camnitted to the first step of the reunification of Ge:rma.ny by :tree
elections as a prerequisite; and this was very definitely not a part of
22
Norman Thomas, "The Situation in Central Europe, u ..2!: .!2!!E
Times, � 8, 1959, P• 15. (Advertisement)
23 ''U.S. Position Explained to Adenauer,"�� Times,
June 19, 1957, P• 3.
24 "West German Reservations About Test Ban�" !!! � Times,
August 9, 1963, P• 11.
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the Rapacki Plan, which purported to be but a small beginnill8 of a solu
tion to Cent� niropean problems.

!i'he West German role both 1n tel.'mS

of motivation for the Plan and 1n terms of the Western rejection of the
Plan appears to have been a major, even a pivotal one.

•

WESTERN REJECTION OF THE RAPACKI PLAN
The initial Rapacki proposal in the United Nations received
very little attention in the Western world.

It seemed in the be

ginning that the only person actively aware of possibilities 1n
the·proposal besides Rapacki and David was Nikolai Bulganin.

Twice

in the months following the October speech Bulganin included the
denuclearization concept as� part of his package proposal.
:Bulganin was not the only one interested.
publicity.

But

He merely got more

There was reaction throughout the Western world.

The Western reaction was somewhat confused in the sense that
many persons confused the Rapacki Plan with disengagement in
Central Europe.

This seems understandable.

George F. Kennan had

given the widely publicized Reith Lectures only a month after
Adam Rapacki had made his speech.

Both had called for a small

beginning in the reduction of tension, both asked for the creation
of a zone between the two opposed blocs that was in different ways
to be partially demilitarized; and both granted the primacy of
Germany as a source of friction and sought in different ways to
neutralize this.

Neither disengagement nor denuclearization

called for a neutral status for Germany; but rather a neutralizing
of what each considered the prime irritant in Germany:
armies or nuclear weapons.

foreign

But beca�se both plans attempted to

reduce the defense capacity of_ t�e German States, the Rapacki Plan
and disengagement were often confused with the concept of a neutral
44
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status for Germany.

The neutrality of the two Germanies might be

an interesting discussion topic, but the neutrality of West
Germany was the direct opposite of the United States policy since

1949, and to� lesser degree the opposite of the NATO policy.
Part of t�e conf'usion was perhaps due to the initial vague'
ness of the Rapacki Plan. 1 After all, it was just a paragraph
in a speech.

The connection with disengagement was unfortunate,

however, because Rapacki was trying specifically to keep his
proposal free from other entanglements.

As time went on this

situation began to change; from the original aloofness to the con
cept of disengagement in the hope that his modest proposal would be
accepted, the variants of the Rapacki Plan began more and more to
contain elements of dis.engagement.

The concluding paragraph of his

February 14, 1958 Memorandum states:
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic has
reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning
the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe
will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to
the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of
foreign armed forces statione� on the territory of the
states included in the zone."
But in terms of his original proposal he was at pains to state that
it must not be con:f'used with other plans.
1For example, Senator Douglas, after interrupting a dis
armament speech of Senator Hubert Humphrey, stated that George F.
Kennan had proposed the atomic neutralization of Central Europe to
be followed by conventional forces withdrawal. See "Speech of the
Honorable Hubert Humphrey," Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2,
January 31 to February 25, 1958, @ashington: Government Printing
Office; 1958) February 4, 1958, p. 1615.
2
see Appendix A this report.
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"It would �ean losing a simple question in a jungle of more oom
licated mat�ers.

our proposal'r•••"3
, \

It would in practice mean the rejection of
Also the connection between Kenna.n's disengage-

ment and neuirality was unfortunate because the latte� represents
a conclusion in regara to the consequences of the former.

Kennan

said:
"PeopJ.e will ask: how do you envisage th� future of
Germany if'not as a full-fledged member of NATO?, Is it
neutrality 1 you are recommending, or demilitar�z�tion, or
a general '1furop�an security pact?
· ,':
"These again are problems for the planner,. The com
binations are many; and they must be studied minutel{ as
alternatives. No outsider can judge which is best."
Moreover, as Rapacki began moving toward disengagement,
Kennan seemed to be moving in the direction of denuclearization.
While discussing the withdrawai of forces, Kennan cannot avoid
pointing to an apparent obstacle to that di.sengagement, namely,
the placing of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO allies.

"If

therefore the Western continental countries are to be armed with
them, any Russian withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe may
become unthinkable once a.J2d for all. •••"5

The relationship between the views of Rapacki and Kennan is
a close one, therefore, and the fact that the West very often re
acted to them both at the same time is understandable. However,
3Adam Rapacki, Polish Facts� Figures, p. 3.
4George F. Kennan, Russia, � � and the West, p. 45.
5Ibid., p. 59. ·
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those favoring one did not need to favor the other.

Denis Healey,

British Labor Member of Parliament, favored disengagement but saw
only a small.amount of merit in the Rapacki Plan.6
The reaction of the West was also conditioned by a view of
the Polish proposal as a Soviet proposal.

This impression was

without doubt greatly strengthened by Bulganin's almost immediate
snapping up of the Plan as a part of Soviet disarmament suggestions.
The question of the authorship of Rapacki's proposal, as stated in
Chapter Three, is a speculative one and is perhaps unnecessary to
answer.

Denis Healey felt that it was a peculiarly Polish sug-

gestion "without Soviet prompting or support.117
time Gomulka had said:

At about the same

"It was the result of our own deliberations

and studies. We wanted to take a first ••• simple and effective step
in reducing international tension.11

8

Certainly the fact that any

proposal would originate in a satellite country was itself signifi
cant even if it were part of general Communist disarmament policy.
However, the evidence available to the West indicated more of a
connection with the policies of the Soviet Union than a separation.
Vaclav David, in his speech of affirmation following Rapacki's at
the United Nations, stated that Czechoslovakia agreed with the de
nuclearization concept "as was proposed by the German Democratic
6
Denis Healey, "How to Start Disengagement," �
Republic, Vol. 138, March 31, 1958, PP• 14-16.
7lli!., p. 16.
8

Arthur Olsen, "The Polish Memo," ��Times,
February 18, 1958, P• 7.

Republic.119 This referred to a July

27, 1957 program of the East

German Government calling for a prohibition of the stockpiling
and manu:f'acturing of atomic weapons in Germany, the withdrawal of
the two German states from the North Atlantic Alliance and the
Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription, agreement on the strength
of the respective armies, and a joint request to the Big Four to
withdraw their forces from Germany. 10 Besides this, previous
Soviet proposals made prior to Rapacki's speech had advocated the
creation of a Central European zone of limited armaments.

Those

who sought a peculiar Polish authorship had to ignore or explain
this evidence if they wished to advocate consideration of the Plan
simply because it was not part of general Communist policy.

The

fact that the Rapacki proposal might not have been Polish need not
indict the Plan; the discussion here is merely an attempt to ex
plain why the Western leaders did not in fact distinguish it as a
Polish proposai.11 The Netherlands' Foreign Minister, Dr. Luns,
returned from the Paris NATO meetings "very pleased with what he
called the failure of the latest Soviet effort to sabotage the
North Atlantic Treaty Conference." 12
The West German reaction was a definite rejection. Adenauer,
911Summary of the Debate," United Nations Review, Vol.
November 1957, p. 85.
10 "Khrushchev Repeats his Denuclearization Proposal,"
�� Times, August 9, 1957, P• 2.

11·"Remove Nuclear Weapons from Central Europe?," New
York Times, December 13, 1957, p. 1.

4,

1211NATO
Meeting Adjourns," � � Times, December 21,

1957, p. 3.
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at the Paris Conference, had not really insisted on nuclear arms
for West Germany, but by January he was seemingly most anxious
to correct an impression that he had been influenced by George F.
Kennan. The Chancellor made it quite clear that he was not so
influenced, and rejected the Rapacki Plan because, like Dulles,
Adenauer felt that the proposal would lead to the neutralization
of Germany.

Such a zone, he said, would give the people in it

no protection; it "would mean the end of NATO, the end of freedom
in Western Europ�, and thereby the end of our own freedom.11 1 3 Dr.
Adenauer was stating this rather strongly, and his remarks were
misleading.

Certainly the decision to rearm West Germany with

nuclear weapons was a step away from neutralization, but the
decision not to so arm West Germany is not a step toward neutra
lity.

Most of the nations of the world did not possess nuclear

weapons; they merely possessed their own national forces, bound
together with others in alliances. Formosa, for example, could
not be called a neutral nation and yet does not possess nuclear
weapons.

To say, as Adenauer did, that the proposal would afford

the people in the zone no protection, is to ignore the faot that
the people in that zone had no protection against nuclear war
anyway outside of the guarantees of Russia and the United States.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons still under the control of the
United States would not alter that;· it moreover would probably
13

11west German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," � �
Times, January 24, 1958, P• 5.
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result in West Germany's rise in importance as a primary target
in the event of war.

In addition, there was a strong feeling

among many Germans, especially Social Democrats, that the nuclear
rearming would decrease chances for reunification of the entire
German State.

The country was in a :f'uror over the Rapacki and

Kennan concepts with meetings being held, and petitions being
circulated; 14 even though Adenauer was firmly against them.

He
said that he would "never, never agree to the Rapacki Plan.11 15
Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano denounced the Kennan ideas
as "sanseless": 6 Wilhelm Grewe, Acting State Secretary in the
Foreign Office said that he would not negotiate on the Rapacki
Plan even if reunification were also on the agenda. 17 But the
Social Democrats and even some members of the Christian Democratic
Union were very stirred by the large amount of public support for
the Rapacki Plan and for Kennan's ideas, but the :Bundestag none
theless gave Adenauer a vote of confidence on January 23,

1958 ;

18

and on March 25th it approved the nuclear rearming of West Germany
by a vote of 275-161 with 26 abstentions. 19
1411Polish Proposal Popular in West Germany," � �
Times, February 9, 1958, p. 3E.
l5"Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10,
1958, p. 59.
16
Ibid.
17
�.

"West German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," � !2E£. Times,
January 24; 1958, p� 5.
1911west German Nuclear Rearming," lli!.!! � Times, March 26,
1 958, P• 10.
18

5l
On the other hand, Field Marshall Harding, retired British
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said during a Bonn conference
in March that the dangers of a military pull-back were actually
leas than the dangers in the existing situation.20 This concurred
with the posi�ion of the Social Democrats in West Germany. Fritz
Erler, prominent spokesman for the Social Democrats, supported the
Rapacki Plan, he said, because missiles that could overfly the
zone made the bases in that zone meaningless; so therefore why
21
not denuclearize in the hope of reducing tension.
Eric
Ollenhauer, the Social Democratic lead.er, called the Plan a first
step toward controlled disarmament; the socialist newspaper Neue
Ruhr Zeitung said after Adenauer had rejected the Plan:

"The only

plan that might have checked the amament race has now been re22 When the Bundestag approved the issue of
buffed most strongly."
nuclear rearming Ollenhauer declared that his party would intro
duce a resolution asking that the issue of nuclear weapons be taken
to the people in a referendum. 23 This was far more than mere
opposition to the paDty in power; the Social Democrat position
reflected a consistent view of nuclear arms and of West Germany's
place in the power picture.

They feared such weapons would

20"Conf'erence on Disengagement," New� Times, March 31,

1958, P• 45.

21Fritz Erler, nThe Reunification of Germany and Security
for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 371.
· 22''Adenauer Opposed on Nuclear Zone,"�� Times,
January 16; 1958, p. 6.
23
11 011enhauer to Request Referendum," � � Times,
March 26, 1958, p. 10.
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2
increase the separation between East and West Germany. 4 For this
same reason they had initially opposed the :formation of the
Federal Republic.
However, the official position prevai1ed.

Felix von Eckardt,

West German Press Chief, summed up Adenauer's reaction.

(1) The

plan made no advance to reunification but asked a sacrifice by
the West.

(2)

Western security would be harmed because the mili

tary parity would be destroyed.

(3) The United States withdrawal

from Central Europe would harm NATO.

(4) Controls and inspection

in the zone would be impossible to organize.

(5)

The pledge of

the nuclear powers not to attack the zone was not a strong enough
guurantee.25 The rejection was made official by means of a note
delivered to Warsaw on the 25th of February, 1958.26
In Great Britain the situation was somewhat similar, in that
the Conservatives generally op�osed Rapacki and Kennan, and the
Labor Party was generally in favor of both.

However, in Britain

the Labor Party was much stronger than were the Social Democrats
in Ge:rmany: this may account for the more moderate position of
ficially taken in London.

Back in December of 1957, Foreign

Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had stated in response to questions in the
Commons that:
"In military reality the buf'fer zone concept is as outdated
24Fritz Erler, "The Reunification.of Germany and
Security for Europa," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 372.
25"Pros and Cons of Polish Proposal," New York Times,
-.February 20, 1958, p. 4.
26"Bonn Rejects Polish Plan," ��Times, March 1,
1958, P• 3°

as the medieval moat. With long27ange aircraft, and missiles
with ranges of 150 miles or more
it is impossible to dis
engage in the sense that may have been possible in the age
of conventional weapons. The choice is between a clearly
defined line .•• and a no-man's land, into which it may be
tempting to infiltrate, to try some kind of coup in the be
lief that undefended territory can be taken without risk
of war. In present circumstances and on the present de
marcation lines, to dissngage might we2e lead to a greater
insecurity and a greater risk of war."

1.i'his position did not satisfy the Labor Party in the least.
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:Ba.ck

in April of 1957, a similar response of Macmillan to Bulganin's

invitation to discuss the Eden Plan had not satisfied the Liberal

Party either.

1

"Jo Grimond, leader of the Liberal party, pressed the Prime
Minister to take up Mr. Bulganin's proposal for reopening
discussion of the Eden Plan through ordinary diplomatic
channels. The object. Mr. Grimond suggested, should be
to ease tension in Eastern Europe and obtain w thdrawal
of Soviet troops from the satellite nations.029

A public opinion poll taken in early 1958 had registered 75% of the

0
people questioned as being in favor of some sort of disenga.gement.3

This did not imply that this high a percentage of people would vote
against the Conservative Party; but the electorate was certainly

27
Mr. Lloyd is being quite conservative here. Just a few
weeks after his Commons' remarks the New York Times (January 26,
1958, p. 3) carried a news article concerning the successful firing
of the Snark missile which hit its target 5,000 miles away. These
,,
were already in service in the Strategic Air Command.
28
11Neutral Zone, 11 Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 22.
2911:M
acmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons"
.
'
��Times, May 1, 1957, P• 6.
30
11Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10,
1958, p. 59.
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being influenced by the advocates of disengagement. A very

in

fluencial advocate was the British mathematician and pacifist,
Lord Bertrand Russell. He wrote open letters to the� Statesman
1

and the Nation 3

much like the letter he was asked to write for

the liberal American journal, the New Republic,

in

which he attempted

to make his view clear.
"A Neutralized Zone to be established in Central Europe com
prising, as a minimum -- Germany, East and West - Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. No alien armed forces, whether
Russian or Western, to be allowed in the Zone. Each country
in the Zone to be free to chooss its own political and eco
nomic system and in particular, East and West Germany to be
allowed to unite with whatever form of constitution they
prefer. No State in the Neutralized Zone to conclude an
alliance vlith a:ny State outside the Zone. Germany to
accept the Oder-Neisse frontier.11 32
Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the Labor Party, was very emphatic on
this point, as was noted in Chapter Two.33 The Labor position

favored such a step as the Rapacki Plan as it favored the concept
of disengagement suggested by George F. Kennan - as bases for

.negotiation.34

3111Soviet Stake in a Divided Germany,'' � Republic, Vol.
139, March 17, 1958, P• 9.
32Bertrand Russell, "Bertrand Russell on Negotiations,"
New Renublic, Vol. 138, January 27, 1958, p. 9.

33see page 21 this report.
3�en though Harold Wilson continues to support the
Rapacki Plan and phased-disengagement, a Labor victory at the polls
does not mean that the British would adopt the Rapacki Plan as
such. Wayland Yound, a member of the Labor Party's disarmament
committee and of the defense committee of the Assembly of the
Western European Union, stated recently that the Polish proposals
could form 11 part of an orderly p:rocess to minimum deterrent
balance." (Wayland Young, "British Labour's Arms Plan," New
Republic, Vol. 150, May 2 3 , 1964, p. 14)
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These factors of opposition might help to explain why the
Conservative reaction seemed to leave room for negotiations. The
reply to Bulg-dllin's 1957 proposal which contained the R�packi con
cept differed from the replies of the other allies in that it
cautiously asked for more information on the Rapacki proposal, and

on non-aggression pacts.35 They evidently felt ·that the Rapacki

Plan in its 1957 form was unacceptable, but saw it as a basis for

6
discussion, as a means of reducing the tension in Central Europe.3
But by February, 1958, the official reaction was a tentative

rejection.37

Italy saw the denuclearizing idea as a threat to European
security, even a,i>ter Khrushchev promised Italian neutrality and
other concessions if they would join the nuclear free belt.
Foreign Minister Pella said:

"The partial or total neutrality of

the great part or Europe as proposed by Khrushchev would not faci
litate but rather make more difficult and impossible the solution

of Europe• s s-ecuri ty.11 38

Premier Hansen of Denmark, hov,ever, rec

commended the Rapacki proDosals for the attention and consideration

of the West.39. Albert Schweitzer called the Rapacki.Plan a ray of

35

"British Reply to Bulganin," New York Times, January 16,
195 8, p. 12.
3611Gaitskill :Backs Polish Plan," New York Times,
January 13, 1958, p. 10.
37":British Reaction to Rapacki," !2!!, � Times,
_
February 12, 1958, p. 13.
3811Italy Rejects Russ Bid," � � Times, March 1,
3
1958 , p. 4 • .
39"Denm
ark Favors Polish Plan," � York Ti�
. es,
January 16, 1958, P• 12.

0
light, 4 However, the few voices approving the Plan could scarce
ly be heard.
The French reaction was quite definitely against the Plan.
They were not hostile to the idea; but they pointed out that the
original buffer zone concept of Anthony Eden had put the zone be
t-\veen a reunified Ge:rmany and the East, whereas the Rapacki zone
ignored the division of Germany and would therefore tend to con
firm the unhealthy situation in Central Europe.41 Some, like
Mendes France, former French Premier, favored the denuclearization
concept as a useful experiment,42 but the official reaction pre
The status quo in Germany and East Europe was not to be
recognized in such a formal fashion,43 nor was the potential
vailed.

removal of West Germany from NATO to be admitted.44
The reaction of the United States45

was a definite rejection

of the Polish Memorandum, February 14, 1958; even though, as in
other countries, voices could be heard
position.

in

opposition to the official

The United States Department of State felt that the
40

11schweitzer Backs Nuclear Zone,11 � York �1.1imes,
April 29, 195 8, p. 14.
4111Premier Gaillard Revives Polish Plan,".� York Times,
January 15, 1958, p. 3.
42
Rugh Gaitskill, Adlai Stevenson, Pierre Mendes France,
"Three Opposition Leaders Discuss Russia and the West, 11 New Republic,
Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 13.
43 11France, NATO Reply to Rapacki Plan," ��Times,
January 11, 1958, p. 7.
4411 Text of Couve de Murville's Speech to French Assembly,"
New York Times, October 30, 1963 , p. 14.
45 see Appendix D for U.S. Reply to Polish Memorandum.
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neutralization of Germany was a long-range goal of the Soviet
Union.46 This was opposed not simply because Dulles seemed against
anything suggested by the Soviet Union, but also because Dulles,
along with Eisenhower and Nixon, felt quite strongly that axJ.Y
attempt to isolate or neutralize a'people as numerous, vital and
vigorous as the Germans could only create another climate for a
Hitler.47 The Rapacki Plan was viewed as leadi�g to that neutra
lization. At a news conference on January 10, 1958, Dulles was
asked about the Rapacki proposal.

He replied:

" ••• such a step would in practice be indistinguishable from
an almost total neutralization of the area because, if it is
not possible to have in the area modern weapons then it might
be imprudent to maintain any forces in the area at all, be
cause they would be in a very exposed condition. 1148
A second element in the U.S. position was that the Plan did not
address itself to the political problems in the area; and in not

so doing tended to perpetuate the existing division of Germany.49
The same day that this position was announced by Lincoln White,
State Department Press Officer, the New� �imes carried an
editorial on the subject in which there was complete agreement with
the State Department reaction.

The editorial maintained that one

4611Text of Dulles News Conference, 11
December 12, 1957, p. 4.

� �

Times,

4711Rapacki Plan," ed.tiorial, �� Times, January 28,

1959, P•. 30.

8
· 4 11Te:x:t of Dulles Speech, 11
195�, P• 6.

�

York Times, January 11,

4911u. s. Reply to Polish Plan," �� Times�
February 19, 1958,. p. 5.

of the first results of the Plan would be the "formal recognition
of the East German State as an equal partner in an international
·
0
undertaking involving the West." 5
A third element in the U.S.
reaction was that the Plan's adoption would seriously alter the
existing balance of forces.

In terms of conventional forces the

Soviet Union had always been granted a preponderance; and the
great equali_zer was nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical.
It must be recalled at this point that the original Rapacki Plan
was being considered here; not the disengagement of forces that
was later to be incorporated into the Plan.

The conventional

armies of both aides were to remain as they were; the only dif
ference being that there would be a prohibition of.nuclear
weapons in the area.

Thus, the Plan was viewed by the State

Department as extremely dangerous, because the conventional forces
would be imbalanced heavily in favor of the Soviet Union11 As
General Norstadt, NATO Commander, pointed out, the removal of

nuclear weapons would destroy NATO's shield.52 Thia was an

understandable reaction, and one which.Adam Rapacki should have
foreseen.

This reaction should not be confused with the debate

in regard to total dependance on nuclear weapons that seemed a
part of the Dulles' policy.

Even those advocating the build-up

of conventional or non-nuclear forces recognized the necessity
5O11The Polish Proposal," editorial, ��Times,
February 19, 1958, p. 26.
5111 u.s. Objects to Rapacki Plan," New�Times,
February 7, 1958, P• 1.

52 Ibid.
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of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as the equalizer of strength.53
With the removal of nuclear weapons

it was felt that a·vacuum

might be created into which the Soviet forces would be tempted.
Lincoln White summed this up when he said:
"This crucial element would depend merely upon the good
faith of the powers having possession of nuclear weapons
and would therefore be unenforceable." "This element
would not appear to make ,my adv�nce toward disarmament,
but only underscore the need for broader disarmament
measures as a guarantee of protection for any area."54
Belgium's Foreign Minister Spaak, later to become Secretary General
of NATO, agreed.

"How can a responsible statesman face his people

with the proposition that their soldiers fight with outmoded
weapons against an enemy with the most mode� arms? 11 55
One of the most consistent objectors to this stand of the
·United States has been Hubert Humphrey, Senator from Minnesota,
and Chairman (1957-1958) of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.

He did not object in the sense

that he actively supported either Rapacki or George F. Kennan;
rather, like Rapacki, he sought a way out of the deadlock in dis
armament by breaking up the total :package of U.S. demands and
negotiating on one item at a time.

In his introduction to the

5
�or example see the report of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania prepared for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Quoted in�� Times,
October 15, 1959, P• 4.
54
11 u.s. Reply to Polish Plan,"�� Times,
February 19, 1958, P• 5.
p. 50.

55

n0ur Atomic Defense," Newsweek, Vol'. 49, May 13,· 1957,
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Subcommittee's final report he stated:
"In its report of September 6, 1957, the subcommittee
expressed the view that progress on disarmament 1 can come
gradually, a step at a time', and that 'it is a mistake to
expect that the problem of disarmament can be solved in
one sweeping overall agreement•. The subcommittee also
concluded that 'if a first step disa:rmament agreement is
to be realized it should be limited both as to armaments
being curtailed and as to the amount of inspection to
be included•. 11 56
His position at·the beginning therefore was one that merely ad
vocated the consideration of these limited proposals as a begin

ning.

1958.57

This is visible in his speech to the Senate on February

4,

But as time passed, Senator HumDhrey began to publicly

advocate an attempt both at disengagement, and the removal of
nuclear weapons from Central Euxope.58 He was very definitely not
alone in this position; but he did not affect the State Depart
ment's total rejection of the Rapacki Plan, both in 1958 and in
later years.
The reaction of the Western powers was thus against the Plan.
5
6u.s. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcom
mittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report
2501, 85th Congress, 2nd Session;-1958, p. ii'f:'"
57"Speech of the Honorable Hubert Hubert Humphrey,"
Con essional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31-February 25,
f
195�(Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1958) February 4,
1958, pp. 1617, 1629.
58For example: "Humphrey· Critical of Ike," � York
Times, February 5, 1958, p. 1; "West German ·Nuclear Arms," Ibid.,
November 23, 195S, p. 42; "Mikoyan ·Pushes Rapacki Plan,"�-,
January 17, 1959, p. 3; "Humphrey Says U.S. Studying Rapacki Plan,"
Ibid., October 17, 1961, p. 33.
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Besides the reasons given it was felt that inspection would be
almost inpossible since many nuclear weapons could be fired from
conventional devices, or could be carried in a brief case.

The

Rapacki Plan tended to discriminate against West Germany, some
felt, because she really gained nothing by joining the zone.
Rapacki proposal seemed doomed to a limbo of oblivion.
was.not the case.

The

Yet this

THE RAPACKI PLAN REFUSES TO DIE
On June 13, 1964, Soviet Premier Khrushchev left from Moscow on a
trip through Scandinavia with a first sto:p at Copenhagen. While travel
ing, he was e:x:peoted by the Assooia.ted Press "to plug for a ban on nuc
lear weapons in the countries he is visiting as well as central Europe."
"As he tours Denmark, No�, and Sweden, Khrushohev probably will try
again to crack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization northern defense
ring by asking the Scandj.navian countries to join in turning the Baltio
l
into a sea of peaoe."
Obviously the Rapacki Plan did not fade away as a result either of
Western :rejections or the passing of time. The Plan remained influential
in two respects. First, the proposal was a stimulus to other :plans simi
lar to Rapacki's and yet varying in one respect or another; second, the
initial Plan was submitted repeatedly by the Soviet Union, Oomulka of
Poland, and by the author himself. The reason basio to this continued
activity ley :primarily in the continued impasse in regard to both Cen
tral European security and general disarmament; almost the same impasse
and situation which had motivated the original :proposal. As time went on,
the rela.xation that occurred in both of the opposed blocs which ma.de the
possibility of war seem less inevitable did not reduoe the possibility of
the redevelopment of tension; the problem remained and would remain until
l

Associated Press release, Kalamazoo Gazette, June 13, 1964, p.l.
See also "Soviet Proposal For a Nuclear Free Zone in Scandinavia" as :pu�
lished in Izvestia., .August 14, 1959, .American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1959, P• 1404.
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the German question was solved and the opposed forces no longer faced ea.ch
other across the slender line of demarcation.
lent example of this.

Berlin furnishes an excel

Even though an uneasy detente had developed, the

situation in Berlin provoked many days of anxiety and still does to�.
The chief source of difficulty seems the very wlnerable and easily ex
ploited access routes through East Germany.

And. as long as the German

question remained unsettled, Poland must remain unsure of her borders,
garrisoned with Soviet troops, and unable to pley- a. more independent role
in either world politics or trade.

Again, as long as the problem re

mained, Central Europe had a potential. for trouble.

Since the large

package proposals did not result in axry progress, the emphasis in solu
tions increasinly- was in the direction of small proposals like Ra.paoki•s.
Several suggestions were now heard in terms of modest proposals; influ
enced by the Rapa.cki Plan and by- a desire for some sort of a. bee;inrdng.
One of the first to publish such a response was Henry Reuss in June
of 1958.

(Mr.

Reuss was a member of the House o:f' Representatives from Wis

consin, and fol'tller deputy co1:.U'.lsel:,fo1t;.the,.,Marsha.ll.'.��a.n) �'.:;/By;. thisl.time:,..the.;
Memorandum had been rejected by- the United States and the direction of
United Sta. tes policy- in regard to :rearming West Germany with nuclear
weapons continued unchanged.

Eisenhower had proposed legislation that

would pel'tllit the Unitad States to sh.a.re its secrets with its allies, as
previously noted.

Reuss felt th.at this was an ominous developement be-

cause it increased the ohanoes that any European war would be a nuclear
�, it increased the number of fingers on the trigger;
• and it oould not
help but result in the Soviet Union feeling compelled to strengthen their
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forces in Eastern Europe with a subsequent greater degree of control over
the satellites. The West, he said, demands that the Russians pull out of
East Europe with no �antees. This is silly. Reuss, therefore, re
OOOllllends mutual withdrawal of foroes west of the Rhine and behind Rus
sian borders, a guarantee of free elections in Germany, self-imposed
arms limitations in Central Europe internally policed-with the possible
prohibition of nuclear arms; a non-aggression pact against the zone; and
a de-emphasis on nationalism in Central Europe in favor of regional poli
2
tical and economic federation.
Reuss is not suggesting a totally demilitarized area; the national
forces would remain for their own defense. If' either side cheated, the
situation would

go

baok to wbat it

Wd.S.

In short, Reuss definitely felt

that proposals like the Rapacki Plan deserved to be tried.3

Reuss' proposals seemed like an echo of .Anthony Eden with a dash of
Rapacki. The proposal of Selwyn Lloyd to the House of Commons merely
echoed Eden. IJ.oyd suggested that Germany be united by free elections
but that East

Germ.any

be left as a. buffer zone; there would be ground

and aerial inspection and arms limits for all countries having forces

within the zone.4 This plan was attacked by the Labor Party because in
their words the proposals did not remove the ca.use of the tension; namely,
the foreign forces in the area.5
A few months later United States Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Monta.na.)
2Henry Reuss, "Breaking the Stalemate," Commonweal, Vol.68, June 20,
1958,, PP• 295-298.
3ibid.
411:British New Plan," � � Times, December , 1958, p. 1.
5
5Ibid.
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•
suggested that the Geman problem be solved by negotiations between the

two German states under the United Nations supervision; or a United Nations
force in Berlin to replace Ea.st and West military forces,
tiations :failed the troops could always return.

If' the nego

Secondly, he suggested

tha.t both Russia and the United States guarantee the existing borders of
Central Europe.

This would have legalized to a greater extent the West

ern territories of Poland.

T.b.i.rdly, he urged:. that serious consideration

be given to an arms limitation and a nuplear free zone in Europe as well
as a. thinning out of opposed forces and a pull-back from contact. He
concluded:

In short, :Mr. President, it seems to me essential tha.t our
policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration
of the Rapacki Proposal, the Eden Plan for a demilitarized zone
in mid.dl.e Europe or similst' propositions in connection with the
reunification of Germany.
11

As might be expected, Mansfield's suggestions received direct opposi
tion from West Germany, 7 but they rated warm commendation from Khrush

chev. 8 · Senator Fulbright revealed his agreement with Mansfield when he
said:

nrt seems to me, for example, i:f' both W8re to move back an equal

distance-however slight the difference-the :possibility of war, espec
ially accidental war, would be reduced. 119
6

''Mansfield Supports Zone Study," � � Times, February

1959, I>• 2.
February

13,

1nwest Germany- Rejects Mansfield,,.s Suggestions," � � Times,

13, 1959, P• 11.

811Soviet Leader Praises Mansfield," � � Times, March 17,

1959, P• 6.
:P• 18.

Surprisingly, an editorial in

9"Fulbright Backs Mansfield," New York Times, March 17, 1959,

the�� Times a.greed with Fulbright.10 However, like Ifumpbrey•s
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suggestions these were largely ignored.
At about the same time as Mansfield, Macmillan was discussing the
Eden Plan with Khrushchev. Both Adenauer and De Gaulle were very upset
with Macmillan because he was speaking of a confederation of the two
Germanies.11 4 month later Russia proposed disengagement and a limited
force zone with, inspection,12 a.nd British diplomats were suggesting that
M.a.CJUillan's ideas of armed force limits and a limit on weapons be pro
posed at a foreign minister's conference with the Soviet Union.13
Macmillan made it quite clear that he thought both the Rapacld. Plan and
Ga.itskill's ideas were extremely dangerous l4 but the other Western

leaders thmlght that he was negotiating on these plans. They converged
on Macmillan with criticism even to the point of General Norstad appear
ing on television to voice criticism of the Prime Minister's position.15
The La.borite Dail.y Mirror responded with the caustic remark: "If
10

P• 34.

uDisenga.gement," editorial, �� Times, March 25, 1959,

1111 nn
Bo and Paris Oppose Macmillan,"�� Times, February 7,
1959, P• 5•
121
1Soviets Push Disengagement, 11 � � Times, March 30, 1959,
p.l.
1311Bri tish Push Limited Disarmament,·"� .!2E1E Times, April l,
1959, p.l.

14Ibid.

l5Ibid.

..
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·General Norstadt wants to go into politics, he should resign and become
a private citizen. Making peace is a. task for statesmen, not for sol

d.iers. 1116 However, by the middle of April, Macmillan was a.gain urging

the nuclear rearming of West Germany,_ and he tied the other ideas to

German reunification much as Eden had done years before.17 The errant
she ;p was back in• the fold, but he was not publioally forgiven by Bonn
18
until November of 1959.
furing April of 1959�another proposal was put forward, this time
by Mendes France.

Re attempted to avoid Western objections in regard

to an imbalance of forces.
Central Europe.

He suggested the creation of three zones in

The first zone would lie. on either side of the demar

cation line, and it would be thirty miles wide.

In this zone there would

be total dis�ent, policed and enforced by United Nation's forces.

In

the next zone, flanking the first zone on both sides, there would be only
the national foroes of the countries

in

the zone, armed only with conven

The third zome, again on both sides, would contain :f'ully
19
armed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.
Jules Moch, a. short time later,
tional weapons.

proposed a similar solution which had, however, circular zones beginning
20

at Berlin.

16

Ibid.

1711British Arms Plans," editorial, � � Times, April 11,
· 1959, P• 20.
18nAde
nauer and Ma.cmill�, 11 � � Times, November 19, 1959,
P• 1.
19
11Mandes Franoe Proposes Three Zones," � � Times, April 3,
1959, P • 3.
20
11Jules Mook A:rms Proposal, 11 � � Times, April 10, 1959,
P• 4•.
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The Irish Minister for Ex:ternal .A:ffa.irs, Fra:ik Aiken, proposed in
September that a nuclear free zone in Central Europe be guaranteed by a
United Nations police force, and that the opposed forces should withdraw
from contact. Russian forces would retire behind the Russian border, and
Western forces behind French borders.21 Italian Foreign Minister Pella
initially supported Aiken, but the support was withdra.wn in December a.f'ter
22
a. visit by Eisenho-wer to Rome.
Harold Stassen, chief'

u. s.

disarmament negotiator, suggested a. Cen

tral European disarmament zone including a. reunified Germany and small
parts of France and the Soviet Union.

23
President Kek:konen of' Finland

2
proposed a Scandinavian nuclear free zone 4, China's Chen Yi proposed

such a zone for Asia.25, and zones were suggested for La.tin .America and
.A:frioa.
Adam Rapacki was at least partly responsible for about ten other pro
posals like the ones mentioned above; differing in some respects and alike
in others; but all favor.mg: some sort of control on the armaments ana./or
forces in the Central European area.. Perhaps the continuing influence of
21 ''U.N. Foi·ce For Zone," New� Times, September 24, 1959, p.l.
22
"Eisenhower Holds Talks In Rome," New� Times, September 25,
1959, P• 28; December 6, 1959, p.34.
23
11Ha.rold Stassen Suggests Zone In Central Europe," April 12,
1959, P• 10.
2411Kek:konen Asks Scandinavian Nuclear Zone," �� Times,

� 29, 1963, p.6.

25 11 Chen Yi Proposes Asian Nuclear Free Belt," � � Times
,

� 12, 1958, P• 4•

···
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the Rapacki Plan was due to the situation which stimulated it, but it was
also due to the repeated submissions and adaptations of the proposal.
After the Memorandum was rejected, and the Geneva. delegates rejected it
again

in October of 1958, Rapacki may have f'elt that without adapting

his proposal there would be no change in the reaction.
At a:rJ.Y rate he made an :ilnportant change in Oslo, No�, where he
presented his ideas in a. speech on October 31, 1958. He now did what he
had said he should not do; that is, to tie the original proposal to
something else, in this case--disengagement.

"If, as the situation seems to indicate the situation
bas undergone a change, we are read,y to consider a.tomio
disarmament in Central Europe combined with an approved
reduction of conventional forces in this area. Under one
conditions that this will not ca.use the deferring of posi
tive decisions and extending nuclear armaments to other ar
mies in t�g meantime, which should be prevented as soon as
possible.

Basically his id.ea was to

divide

the enlarged proposal into two stages.

The first phase consisted of a zonal pan on the production of nuclear
weapons, on the building of' nuclear installations and the givillg of
nuclear weapons to other parties. The second step was to be a. ban on
all present nuclear installations in the zone after the conventional
forces had been reduced to parity. Tbus he sought to counter the West
ern objection that to denuclearize the area would create a serious mili
tary imbalance because of the preponderant Soviet conventional force.2 1
26
p.1.

"Rapacki Seeks Support," New � Times, November 1, 1958,
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:But the new Rapacki Plan was never officially presented to the various
governments and was never, therefore, ever officially answered. However,
this revised proposal was quite likely a stimulus to Macmillan's wavering
in 1959.
The ne:x:t major resul:mission of the proposal was by Gomulka, First
Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. Speaking· before the General
Assembly on September 27, 1960, Gomulka repeated the two-stag-ad, 1958,
variation-of the Rapacki Plan with this comment:
"Tb.a very reason for the failure of disarmament negotiations
which have been conducted hitherto leys in the dangerous and fal
lacious theory that peace can be only a.n outcome of the so-called
balance of terror between the Fast a.."ld the West, i.e., between
socialism and capitalism. This theory determines the policy of
the Western Powers. This concept is detrimental to peace- it
results not in controlled disarmament but in the control of
existillg armaments by both sides." 28
He went on to sa:y- that no matter how good inspection may be, the pos
sibility of surprise attack is still present. Even though the United
States sey-s she will never attack, the possibility of error exists. If
Rapacki' s Plan had been adopted in 1958, Central Europe would now be re
laxed rather than tense. If it were adopted now it would "reduce the risk
of the outbreak of nuclear-missile war in this sensitive area. and conse
quently, also, the da.nc,ce:r of the use of such weapons of mass destruction

on a global scale. n29 Back in Warsaw the following month, Gomulka ohal
lenged the West to show its sincerity by acceptillg the Rapacki Plan as a

Oamulka.,

28w.
"Peaceful Coexistence," Official Records: General
Assembly, 15th Session 874th Plenary Meeting, November ,- 1960, -P• 161 •...

29

�-, :P• 161
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basis for negotiation. He asked Adenauer to permit a :plebiscite in West
Germany to let the people vote on the issue; 30 obviously confident that
the vote would favor negotiating the Plan.
This :proposal, too, was unconditionally rejected by the United States.
This was after Rapa.old :presented his f'ull :plan again to the Disarmament
Conference in Geneva in March of 1962.

This rejection by the United

States was almost automatic by now. Max Frankel, ��Times Wash
ington correspond.ant :paraphrased Dean Rusk's comment:
"But all the thinking here appears to be based on the
theory that the admittedly undesirable confrontation of
Con:mnmist and Western forces in Europe is nonetheless
:preferable to the creation of a military or political
•vacuum• • n3l
The Poles had a difficult time understanding why the proposal was re
jected.

It seemed to them that Washington did not even study the pro

posal but just automatically rejected it.32
The advocates of the Ra:pacld Plan were still not ·discouraged.· Dar
ing the year 1963 the proposal was repeatedly subnitted and rejected; and
for a time it was tied to the 'i'est Ban Treaty. But to no avail. The
United States remained adamant-no troop or weapons withdrawal f'rcm
Central Europe.
30

11Gomulka Challenges West With Rapacki Plan, 11
October 22, 1960, p.2.

.!2!! � Times,

31
Max Frankel, "Rusk Opposes Disengagement," � � Times,
October 29, 1961, P• 3.
32
"Polish Press Scores
1962, P• l.

u. s.

Sta.nd, 11

B2:! � Times,

April 6,
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Gomulka tried again on January 19, 1964.

He advocated a non•e:ggrsss:ii"an

pact, the formation of regional security zones outside Central Europe where
in nuclear weapons could be banned, a general disarmament agreement, better
trade :relations; and significantly a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central
Europe.

Thia freeze he regarded as an extension rather than a replace-

ment of the Rapa.old. Pla.n. 33 The idea of the nuclear freeze was represented
by Rapacki as an attempt to get around Western objections in regard to a
military disadvantage by permitting forces in Central hu:rope to maintain present levels of' nuclear weapons. 34 Paul Underwood, Times cor
respondent in Warsaw, said that Rapacki avoided the question of' the pos
sible ef'feot of the freeze on the proposed multi-national polaris fleet,
but that informed sources had stated that the fleet ·.:would be banned. 35
Nonetheless, the freeze idea. was made a formal proposal and was published in the United States on March

6,

1964. 36

This is the ourrent form of the Rapacki Plan and this, too, has
been initially rejected by the West but not as strongly as before.
William Foster, Director of U. S. A.."l"DlS Control and Disa.i'ID8IIlent Agency,
saw the freeze plan as a most promising area for agreeme ·, 1 jnking it

33

_ ''New Polish Plan," � � Times, January 19, 1964, P• 20.

34

"Freeze Plan,·" ,!!2!! � Times, March l, 1964, P• 2.

35

"Text of' Polish Freeze Proposal, 11
1964, P• 2.
36

��

Times, March 6 1

See Append.ix C for complete text of the proposal.
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to President Johnson's massage in January of 1964.37 Secretary of State
Rusk foresaw sane difficulties and vra.nted to discuss it with the other
Western powers.

The final reaction is not as yet complete. The Rapacki

Plan is, thus, far fra:n dead. The :proposal began as a :paragraph in a
speech, was later e:icpa.nded, and then e:icpa.nded again, before it contracted
to the mod.est proposal of todazy-. The Rapa.old. Plan has adapted-the
West really has not.

37

''U.S. to Study Freeze,"� !2E1£ Times, March 7, 1964.
President Johnson's message was to the Geneva Conference; 11 •••let us
agree: (a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national
control of states whioh do not now control them." (New � Times,
January 22, 1964, P• 4.)
·
· ·.

CONCLUSIO!I
The Rapacki proposal made initially in the United Nations
General Assembly on October 2,

1957,

was a proposal to remove all

nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery from the countries
of West German�, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

It was

a proposal that arose out of the post-war division of Europe into
tow opposed groups facing each other in Central Europe; out of
the deadlock betwen the great powers in terms of both European
security and general disarmament; and it flowed out of the context
of specific proposals that had been made before.

,.
1955 was

The Eden Plan in
Rapacki

a very definite forerunner of fhe Polish proposal.

was not the only person who authored a simple beginning to a com
plex problem.

The failure of package diplomacy in disarmament

negotiations had resulted in the voices of several people being
raised in defense of a first small step.

The voice of George F.

Kennan was one such voice, as was that of Hugh Gaitskill, and
Nikolai Bulganin.
But the initial proposal was not accepted by the West.

The

reasons for the rejection were that the adoption of the proposal
would tend to weaken NATO and/or Western defenses generally, while
the Soviet strength would not really be affected.
imbalance would be prejudicial to the West.

The resulting

Rapacki sought to

counter these objections by including in his proposal the concept
advocated by Kennan, Gaitskill, and others; namely, the reduction
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in conventional arms and armed forces.

Rapacki was still seeking

the simple first step, but in view of Western obdurance added the
disengagementI idea.
similar reaso�s.

This, too, was rejected by the Wast for very

Evan if the conventional forces were reduced to

parity, the Soviet Union was very much closer to the area of
Central Eu:rope\than was the United States; and opinion in the U.S.
was that a withdrawal of forces from West Garmany w?uld result
in a withdrawal from Europe.

This, in turn, seemed like a be

trayal of trust to Western Europe.
a retreat in the Rapacki concept.

The repeated rejections forced
Beginning with the removal of

all atomic weapons from a specific area, then expanding the idea
to include conventional arms and forces; Rapacki contracted the
proposal in March of 1964 to refer only to a freeze of existing
armaments.

This was also rejected.

If there is any single thread running through the brief his
tory_of the Rapacki Plan that thread is without doubt Germany.

In

particular it is West Germany that provided.some of the strongest
motivation for the Plan, both for the original suggestion and for
the repeated submissions and variations.

West Garmany also pro

vided the single most important cause of the Western rejection of
the Plan.

As was seen, this primacy of West Germany is not just

because West Germany is the locale of the confrontation of forces,
but also because West Germany is ·intrinsically bound up with Polish
security, and with the foreign policy of the-United States.
The Position of the United St�tes in response to the Soviet
threat that developed after the war slowly grew into a policy called
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containment.

Vlhereever any Communist aggression was experienced,

the policy implied Western resistance.

The concentrated effort

was intended, very simply, to hold Communism from further ter
ritorial gains.

The policy was not always successful on a global
It may perhaps

scale, but in Central Europe it was successful.

be argued that Russia contributed to this success of the contain
ment policy because she already controlled as much territory

as

she could handle; but at any rate the policy of the United States,
as exemplified by Secretary of State· Dulles .'from".1952-1959, was
a rigid enforcement of the containment concept by means of poised
defenses and global alliances with other nations.
This rigid policy was, of course, reflected in the disarmament
negotiations.

The United States, as well as the Soviet Union,

very often proposed mutually unacceptable plans for disarmament in
the sense that very little room was ever left for compromise at
the conference tables.
weakness by both sides.

To compromise was considered a sign of
Both seemed to be seeking maximum security

for themselves vn.thout much consideration for the opposite number.
A very often repeated proposal of the Soviet Union, for example,
was that America must remove her foreign bases from around Russia.
This sort of withdrawal was understood in the United States as a
direct threat to American defense capability.
John Foster Dulles stated in 1957:

On the other ho.nd,

"We seek collective security so

that the smaller and weaker nations cannot be attacked and overrun
one by one, and the United States in the end, left isolated and
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encircled by overwhelming hostile forces. 11

1

to be asking the same thing for themselves.

:Both sides here seem
This, moreover, is a

reflection ot the entire disarmament movement.

There seems to have

been a complete inability to see any good in the other group's
proposal.

Even if a member of the Western Alliance conceived

the plan, if it in any way resembled something ·the Russians had
,suggested it wa,s considered falling into a Soviet trap.

This was

the substance of the criticism Mr. Macmillan enjoyed from :Bonn
and Washington in 1959 when he flirted with the idea of zonal
troop reduction and arms control.
There is rather an obvious question here - w�s either side
sincere in their efforts to negotiate disarmament?

Were the pro

nouncements of sincerity by the State Department and/or by the
Russians merely intended for their influence on public opinion?
The answer to this question must� of necessity, be speculation.
:But an affirmative answer to the question has been suggested by
reputable people.

Hugh Gaitskill charged the West with con

tinual prevarication in the handling of Soviet proposals - the

West called them all propaganda and did nothing about t em.2

James Reston of the� York Times suggested insincerity when
"Problem number one is how to keep our promise to

he wrote:

negotiate, made at the recent NATO meeting in Paris, without

July

1

22,

11Text of Dulles News Conference," New York Times,
1957, P• 6.
2

11 Gaitski11 Scores West on Disarmament," New York
Times, January 27, 1958, p. 8.
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risking the possibility of stopping the arms race at a point high
ly favorable to the Soviet Union.11 3
Philosophy at Harvard, wrote:

Robert Wolff, Professor of

"But Marx was no fool, and were he

alive today he would no doubt amend his dictum to read:

capitalism

thrives on the preparation for war, whether that war is fought or
not.

Can we s9 confidently deny this c1:targe?

I wonder.114

Dr.

Inglis, Senior �hysicist at the Argonne National Laboratory,
'

'

stated that it is difficult to tell in either the Russian or
American proposals-whether there is sincerity or merely a desire
to look purer.

the former.5

He felt the latter intention prevailed more than

Further substantiation for this position could be

sought in the numerous references in reputable newspapers to the
fact that the United States is either behind, is gaining, or is
dropping back in the propaganda war; or that the U.S. position of
leadership in the world is being.challenged by a certain disarma
ment proposal.
Henry Kissinger tried to explain this by making the point that
this is not a legitimate world order but a revolutionary one.

A

legitimate world order is one in which all the great powers accept
the international order; whereas a revolutionary world order is a
system containing a power or powers which refuses·. to accept either

3James Reston, "Conference Preparations," New� Times,
January 5, 1958, P• 8.
411Disarma.ment, 11 letter, ��Times, September 2 ,
5

1959, p. 28.

5Dr. Inglis, "Arms Con.trol Effort Buried in State,"
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, May 1957, p. 174.
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the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of - '.
other states.

Diplomacy, he said, has a difficult function in a

revolutionary world worder.

In a legitimate order diplomacy seeks

to compromise �isagTeements on the basis of a tacit agreement to
agree.

But in a revolutionary order'diplomacy has tactical sig

nificance -- to_prepare one's position for the next test of
strength. In a �egitimate society negotiations seek to bridge
differences, to persuade by reason, and to compromise.

But in a

revolutionary order negotiations are still possible, but the
diplomats cannot persuade -- different languages are spoken. Dip
lomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to
6
attach the uncommitted to one of the contender's views.
What merit is there is this speculation?

The point is that

even if Adam Rapacki was as sincere as Sidney Gruson, New York
Times correspondent, said he was7 , his proposal may not so much
have entered an arena of negotiation but a stage on which positions
were determined beforehand, by the course of history up to that
point.

Part of that history was the deadlock in terms of the

division of Germany. Both sides seemed unable to do anything other
than attempt to incorporate their side of the defeated state into
their own respective coalitions.

For this reason, Fritz Erler,

felt that one should blame the West as well as the East for the
6
Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, October 1956, p. 37.
· 7 Sidney Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan, 11
January 6, 1958, p. 12.

lli!!! � Times,

8o
continuing division of Germany.
"The c:ruel fact is that both East and West, in basing
thair .. policies upon the integration of their respective
parts of Germany into their power systems, further con
solidate the partition of Germany and destroy any hope for
a peaceful reunification. 11 8
And a result of this, he continued, will be that "NATO will become
a symbol of the partition of the country instead of a symbol of
common de:fense.11 9

by John Reshetar; 10

This position was considered Soviet propaganda
but an objective view of the matter suggests

that there is at least the possibility that the Russians were not
alone responsible for the wall in Berlin.
other:

who is correct?

Neither?

Each side blames the

Both? Who is telling the truth?

Perhaps an example will somewhat clarify the confusion.

Konrad

Adenauer seems to be the pivotal figure throughout this whole
controversy.

Part of a 1962 article written by him follows.

"In the disarmament conference which has been under
t
way in Geneva since March
14th of this year, the United
States has submitted extremely far-reaching and well con
sidered disarmament plans which we emphatically support.
The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, again and again
aim at shifting the military equilibrium in favor of the
Eastern bloc. This applies in particular to the plans
for regional disarmament and so-called aton-free zones in
Central Europe, by which it is intended to weaken European
defense; as well as to the Soviet refusal to agree to any
kind of control, for fear that inspection would remove the
secrecy of the closed Soviet system in contrast to the open
system of the free world. It seems that the Soviets again
wish to use the present disarmament conference only as a
vehicle for propaganda.
"Despite all disappointments, the efforts of the
8
Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and
Security for Europe, 11 World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p� ,. 366.

-

-9 Ibid.
10u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub
Committee on Disarmamenj, Control� Reduction.£!. Armaments,
Report 2501, Reply to �uestionaire, p. 436.
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Western powers to find ways and means leading·to disarmament
must be energetically continued. Our hope must be .that con
sistency on the part of the West in the disarmament field
will convince the Soviets of the necessity to enter into
serious negotiations which take into account the interests
of both sides.1111
This speech tends to support Kissinger's thesis that the various
sides speak different languages.
and all against the other.

Adenauer is all for_one side,

He said that the regional proposals

would shift military equilibrium to the Soviet side, but would not
the Soviets be pulling out of Eastern Europe?

The former

Chancellor goes on to state that the Soviets refuse any kind of
control.

This is simply not true.

There are repeated instances

of Soviet initiative in terms of control and inspection; proposals
to which the West did not agree.

How can Dr. Adenauer expect.

the inflexibility of the West to create a climate for Soviet
compromise?

A compromise that takes into account the interests

of both sides is a desirable commodity but it cannot come from
only one side.

Walter Lippman says, ttEach side knows that its

asking price is impossible.

The reason why both sides continue to

ask an impossible price is that both of them think that a divided
Germany may be better than a:ny united Germany that can be brought
into existenca.11

12

If there is any truth at all to these allegations, then the
Rapaoki Plan did not have a chance from the beginning.

The Polish

proposal would have altered the existing situation in Central
11Konrad Adenauer, "The German Problem, A World Problem,"
,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, October 1962, p. 64.
12
-valtar Lippmann, 11 The�.:German Question, 11 Newsweek,
Vol. 62, September 2, 1963, p. 15.
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Europe, it would have changed the developing situation in terms
of West German nuclear arms; and for these reasons could not have
been accepted.

Consider the specific objections.

First, the

proposal would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany.

But

other attempts at negotiations have not resulted in German unity
either.

One could suggest that the formation of the West German

Government in 1949, or the inclusion of Germany in NATO in 1954,
or the desire tQ rearm West Ge·::-many with nuclear arms in 1957 also
contributed to the division of the
the area involved is too small.

t,,70

German States.

Secondly,

Basic to this ?bjection is the

r
fact that
missiles could overfly such a zone easily.

However,

the Rapacki Plan never was meant as a general disarmament measure.
but as a beginning for negotiations.

If ballistic,Jilissiles can

overfly the zone, on the other hand, one could construct an argu
ment maintaining the position that in that case the udoption of
the zone would not involve any real shift in world power alignments.
Thirdly, the proposal is slanted in favor of the East.

The sug

gestion is coming from Communist Poland - it is not suprising that
it might be so slanted.
Soviet Union?
the West would.

But is the Plan thc.t advantageous to the

Russia would withdraw more than twice the distance
Russia would withdraw from an area of 457,000

square kilometers, whereas the West would withdraw from an area of
only 248,OOO square kilometers. ·What seems behind this objection,
however, is the assumption that if American troops moved out of
West Germany there would be no room for them on the continent;
they would have to be moved all the way across the Atlantic.

Even
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if this were true it need not lead again to American isolationism.
Modern weapons technology has made much of conventional warfare
obsolete anyway.

Think orily of the Polaris fleet, air bases in

Turkey, Greece, Britain, Portugal, and in the Arctic area.

The

point that must be made here, however, is that the assumption
of complete American withdrawal if not in West Germany is not
based in fact.

No one, besides Khrushchev, advocated a complete

withdrawal; it was merely assumed by men such as Paul Henri
Spaak and General Norstadt.
Cetrainly the West �hould not desert Europe, or leave West
Germany helpless in the face of threats to her survival.

But

the Rapack Plan did not ask this of America; and it need not
lead to that result.

It is one of America's goals to get the

Soviet troops_ out of Eastern Europe.

It was to a great extent

America's lack of knowledge that assisted the Soviet forces in
attaining these forward positions.

V/hat other way to alter the

situation than by limited arms reduction coupled with reciprocal
troop withdrawal?

If one adds conventional armed force reduction

with inspection the Western objections become vaporous.

Of course

this is what the Soviets wanted; it is what Poland wanted, too.
:But this fact does not nake the Polish proposal bad for the U.S.
There is more than black and white - there is gray in between;
and the failure to recognize this is an admission of bankruptcy in
foreign policy.
Suppose the United States and the other Western nations, in
cluding West Germany, had been interested enough in 1958 to have
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negotiated Rapacki's proposals.

What might have been the con

sequences in such a hypothetical situation?
1)

All nuclear weapons, systems of delivery, stockpiles, and the

potential for. production of nuclear weapons would have been removed
from West Germany.

This, of course, would mean a complete altera

tion in the foJ;Ward planning of NATO; for the nuclear shielf concept
would no longer be applicable to the situation •.
2)

Russia would have been required to remove nuclear weapons and

whatever pertained thereto from her forces in the three satel
lite states.

Thus the change in planning would have been an equal

disadvantage to both sides.
3)

The Western nations would now be at a serious disadvantage in

regard to conventional forces.
favor of Russia.

There would be an imbalance in

Therefore, a major element in the negotiations

would have been the withdrawal of conventional forces and equip
ment from the nuclear free zone; and an insistance on the part of
the West that the remaining national forces be reduced to parity
as soon as this could be arranged.

The removal of nuclear weapons

would not take place until such parity had been realized.
4)

Verification of this withdrawal and reduction as well as the

complete removal of nuclear devices would be placed in the hands
of a United Nations special force reporting directly to the Dis
armament Commission of the U.N.

This special force would be com

posed of an equal number of members of both sides; as well as a
number of representatives from uncommitted nations.

Both Russia

and the United· States would have the right of continuous aerial
observation of the zone in addition to the special force control.
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5)

A settlement of the German problem of reunification by means

of a confederation of German delegates chosen on the basis of
population representation from both East and West Germany's co�
bined population. Such an arrangement would benefit West
Germany and would thus be a strong test of how much the Russians
were willing to compromise in order to get the non-nuclear zone.
The reunification would be in three stages. First, a constitutional
convention attended by the chosen representatives; secondly,
radification by both East and West German electorates in super
vised elections; and thirdly, free elections to form a national
government of Germany.

The resultant State would not be permitted

to become a part of any alliance; but rather would be the recipient
of guarantees from all of the major powers.
6)

Russian forces behind Russian borders, and Western armies

west of Germany would be required to reduce in strength so that
within one year from the date of the treaty reasonable parity would
exist.

Since both sides would still possess nuclear weapons,

ab�olute parity would not be essential. There is not parity now
in conventional forces, but it is the Western view that a balance
is achieved by nuclear weapons equality.

7) Efforts to achieve general dis�rmament agreements would con
tinue as before. Until such agreements could be worked out both

sides would retain their ability to destroy the other.
Is this kind of a hypothetical situation too idealistic for
consideration?

The author submits that it is not.· Much of the

above has already been proposed by the Soviet Union; her greatest
area of compromise would be in permitting a German confederation
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in which East Germany would not be of equal status with West
Germany.

The g:reatest area of compromise for the West would be

to accept the idea of the buffer zone safeguards as being suf
ficient.

The hypothesis to be proven must be attempted.

Such an

attempt is clearly preferrable to the balance of terror that
existed then, and still exists today.
The concept of preserving the peace through a balance of
terror, Denis Healey said, rests on two assumptions.

First, that

no one will take the first step toward war knowing the conse
quences.

However, Hungary and Suez have both demonstrated the

futility of this assumption.

Neither Russia nor America, Mr.

Healey said, has sufficient control over events on its own side
of the Iron Curtain to rule out the possibility of such a local
conflict.

The second assum tion is that America will massively

respond to any major Russian attack.

This assumption has steadily

dwindled ever since Russia developed the potential to completely
1
destroy the United States. 3
One need �ot agree with Mr. Healey's analysis, but little
disag:reement can be possible that the world is today quite dif
ferent from the bi-polar world that existed immediately after the
war.

No longer is either Russia or America the free agent.. There.

·is France, and there is China; with many smaller �enters of power
that one must consiaer.

'Elle Communist bloc is_ loosening with the

13Denis Healey,· "The Case for Disengagement,'' �
Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, P• 11.
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with the increased trade relations that have been made with the
Western nations.

In the midst of this polycentrism an absolute

refusal on the part of the United States to consider limited
proposals, as Kennan pointed out, can only result in forcing a •.
unity upon the Communist bloc that would not be there otherwise.

14

However, there are signs of the possibilities _of change.
The test ban treaty, for example, provides a basis for hope in
that it reveals compromise by both sides:

The United States in

agreeing to a limited ban without inspection, and the Soviet
Union in dropping the non-aggression pact that was originally
attached.

The simultaneous reduction in fissionable material ,

and the destruction of obsolete bombers are steps that would
seem to reduce tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
In West Germany the five per cent clause, time, and prosperity
have reduced the bloc effect of the refugee vote.

Erhart has

replaced Adenauer. Khrushchev, because of his troubles with
China may be more willing to make concessions to the West. Agree
ment on the Rapacki Plan does seem to be more possible now -than
at any time before.

The possibilities inherent in the proposal

include not only a reducing of tension; but the potential of the
freer development·of the satellite states towards institutions
of their own, a practical solution to the German question, and
a beginning of a type of solution of world problems that is both
peaceful and honorable.
14oeorge F. Kennan, 0
?olycentrism and Western Policy ,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, January 1964, p. 182.
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Perhaps the Rapacki Plan will not work.

Perhaps after it is

attempted, the situation will revert to what it is today.
Would anything be lost? We will never know until we try.

Perhaps.

APPENDIX A
TROOP CONCENTRATIOlf"
EOROPE

NATO
-

WARSAW �

:Benelux countries•••250,000
Denmark••••••••••••• 40,000
France
Fra.nce •••••••••••470,000
United States•••• 50,000
Great Brita.in
Great Brita.in ....580,000
United States•••• 50,000
Greece•••••••••••••·•l75,000
Italy
Italy.•••••••••••350,000
United States•••• 10,000
Morocco •••
United States•••• 10,000
Norway•••••••••••••• 30,000
Paldsta.n••••••••••••l60,000
Portugal•••••••••••• 60,000
Spain
United States•••• 3,000
Turkey••••••••••••••400,000
West Germany
German••••••••••• 130,000
United States••••200,000
Great Britain•••• 48,000
France••••••••••• 30,000
NATO (General) •••1®01000
3,16,000

Albania •••••••••••• 35,000
Bulga.ria•••••••••••l60,000
Czechoslovald.a•••••200,000
East Ge�
Germa.n••••••••••150,000
Soviet••••••••••400,000
lfunga.ry

lfunga.ry.-• • • • ••• • 90' 000
Soviet·o·•••. •. ••·• 60,000
Poland
Poland••••••••�.310,000
Soviet•••••••••• 30,000
Ruroa.n:ia
Ruma.nia•••••••••250,000
Soviet•••••••••• 30,000
Russ:ia•••••••••••1,2�,ooo
2,8 5,000

RAPACKI PLAN AREA
Warsaw Pact •••••• 1,08o,OOO

NAT0.•••••••••••••••548,000

l
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APPENDIX B

TEXT OF POLISH NOTE .AN.D MEMORANilJr
FEBRUARY 14, 1957
ttI wish to refer to the conversation which Iha.d on December 9, 1957,
with the Charge d 1 Affaires of the :Flnbassy of the United Sta.tea in War
saw. In this conversation I have presented the position of the Polish
Government in respect to the tendencies to make the nuclear armaments
in Europe universal and particularly towards the acceleration of arma
ments in Western Ge:rma.ny. The threat of further complications, primarily
in Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings come into a
direct contact and the apparent danger of an increase in the international
tension have prompted the Polish Government to initiate at that time dll
ect discussions through diplomatic channels on
• the Polish proposal sub
mitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, con
cerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.
"This proposal has evoked a wide interest in government and poli
tical circles as -well as in the broad strata of public opinion in
many countries.
. "Taking into account a number of opinions expressed in declarations made in connection with the Polish proposal .and with the view
to facilitate negotiations, the Polish Government has resolved to pre
sent a more detailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its ex
pression in the attached memorandum which is simultaneously being
transmitted by the Polish Government to the governments of France,
Great Britain, and the Union of Societ Socialist Republics as well as
to the governments of other interested countries.
"The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the solution
of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide scale requires, first of
all, negotiations among the great powers and other countries concerned.
Therefore, the Polish Government supports the proposal of the u.s.s.R.
Government concerning a meeting on the highest level of lea.ding states
men with the participation of heads of governments. Such a meeting oOtlld
also result in reaching an agreement on the question of the establish
ment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agreement
among the countries concerned not be reached in the meantime. In any
event the initiation at present of discussions on the question of a
denuclearized zone in Central llu.rope would contribute to a successful
course of the above mentioned meeting.
"The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of
the United States will stuc:cy- the attached memorandum and that the pro
posals contained in it will meed with the understanding of the
l
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Government of the United States. The Polish Government on its part
would be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this problem
ll
with the Government of
the United States.

"On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Repub
lic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal
concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.
The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Repub
lic declared their readiness to accede to that zone.
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the
conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearized zone
could lead to a.n improvement in the international atmosphere a.nd faci
litate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of
other controversial internal issues, while the continuation of nuc
lear armaments a.nd ma.king them universal could only lead to a further
soli4ifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a
further complication of this situation, especially in Central Europe.
"In December, 1957.the Government of the Polish People's Republic
renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels.
"Considering the wi.de repercussions which the Polish initiative
has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging f'rom the
discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of
the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elabora
tion of its proposal, which ma::, facilitate the opening of negotiations
and reaching of an agreement on this subject.
"I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland,
Czeohoclovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Repub
lic. In this territory :nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured
nor stockpiled., the equipment and installations designed for their
· servicing would not be located there; tha use of :nuclear weapons
against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.
"II. The contents of the obligations arising from the estab
lishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following
premises:
11 1
. The states included in this zone would undertake the obli
gation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and
not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons
of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their ter
ritories of installations and equil)IIlent designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles• launching equipnent.
11 2.
'lhe four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and
u.s.s.R.) would undertake the foliowi.ng obligations:
"(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their
forces stationed· on the territories of states included in this zone;
neither to maintain nor
• these states
" to install.on the territories of
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any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons,
including missiles' launching equipment.
11 (:B)
Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever,
nuclear weapons
• nor installations and equipment designed for servicing
nuclear weapons�to governments or other organs in this area.
"3. Th.e__.powar which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should
undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory
of the zone or against any targets situated:in this zone.
Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status
of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and
a.ga.inst
which nuclear weapons should not be used.
·
11 4.
Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of
any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not
to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to
transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area.
Neither will they. install equipment or installations designed for the
servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment,
on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to
governments or other organs in this area.
"The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obliga
tions could be the jubject of detailed mutual stipulations.
"Ill In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the
obligations contained in Part n, paragraphs 1-2 and 4, the states con
cerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control
in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its function:i.ng.
"l. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control.
Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which
would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, oould also be established.
"The details and forms of the :implementation of control can be agreed
upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in
this field, as wall as on the basis of proposals sul:mitted by various
states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to
the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.
"'llie system of control established for the denuclearized zone could
provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament
agreement.
11
2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the pro
posed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established.
There could participate .in it, for example, representatives appointed/
not excluding additional personal appointments/ by organs of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or
representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping
in Europe, could also paxticipate in it.
"The procedure of the establishment, opera.tion and reporting of the
control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations.
"IV The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states
included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate inter
national convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states
might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:
11 1.
These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral
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declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation de
posited with a mutually agreed upon depository state.
·
11 2.
The obligations of great :powers be embodied in the form of a
mutual document or unilateral. declaration/ as mentioned above in :paragraph l/;
·,
11 .· 'lh
3
e obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed
in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declara.tions/ as mentioned above in :para.graph 1/.
"On the basis of the above :proposals the government of the Polish
People's Repubiic suggests to initiate negotiations fo� the purpose of
a :further detailed elaboration of the :plan for the establishment of the
denuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as
well as of the �ea.ns of imIJ.ementation of the undertaken obligations.
"The government. of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to
state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a
denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an
agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional arma
ments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the
states included in the zone."

APPENDIX C
TEXT OF RAPACICT FREEZE PROPOSW,
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic has already on num
erous occasions manifested its consistent desire in the search for solu
tions aimed at bringing about international detente and disarmament and
lent its support to all constructive proposals designed to achieve this
end. The reduction of international tensions and creation of conditions
of security in Central Europe have always been and continue to be matters
of particular concern to the Polish Government. This objective can and
should be achieved above all by way of arresting the armaments race in
this part of the world.
, .
"With this in mind the Government of the Polish People's Republic
presented sane time ago a plan for the creation of a nuclear free zone
in Europe which, as is known, aroused the interest of numerous states
and of world public opinion. In the view of the Polish Government that
plan continues to be fully topical.
"The Polish Government believes tha.t there are at the present time
suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation
of which could facilitate further steps leading to a detente, to a
strengthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament.
"Basing itself' on these premises, the Government of the Polish
People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermo
nuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a pro
posal would be of particular significance to the security both of Po
land and all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Eur
ope, since, while in no wey affecting the existing relation of forces,
it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race.
"I The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and
the:rmonuclear armaments include in principle the territory of the Polish
People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Sooialist Republic, The Garman
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Ge:rmany, with the re
spective te��itorial waters and airspace.
"ll. The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermo
nuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and de
livery.
"III Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the prpposed
freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to
introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to
accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons.
"IV To insure the implementation of these obligations, an ap
propriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.
l
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"The supervision over the implementation of other oblication not to
produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered by the freeze would be
exercised in plants which are or could be used·for such production.
"To insure the implementation of other obligations control would be
established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in
proper frontier rail\vey-, road, waterwey junctions, sea and air ports.
"The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions
composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of NATQ on a parity
basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representa
tives from other states. The composition, structure and procedure of the
control organs will be the subject of detailed arrangement.
"Parties whole armed forces are stationed in the area of the armament
freeze, and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear wea
pons would exchange at periodic meetings of their representatives all
information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obli
gations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments.
"V Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted
above should be embodied in appropriate documents.
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter
into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an
agreement on the implementation of these objectives.
"The Polish Government will give due attention to all constructive
suggestions which would be in accordance with the objectives of the
present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central
Europe.
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favorable
attitude to the proposal submitted hereby."

APPENDIX D
TEXT OF U.S. REPLY TO POLISH NOTE ON RAPACKI PLA?il

''United States Ambassador to Poland, Jacob D. Beam delivered on� 3,
the U.S. Government's reply to the Rapacki Plan proposals elaborated in
the memorandum attached to the Polish Government's note of February 14.
Ambassador Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Duputy Foreign.Minister
Josef Winiewicz. The text of the U.S. reply is as follows:
"�callenoy: I have the honor to a.oknowledge the receipt of Mr.
Ra.packi's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating
on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a
denuclearized zone in Central Europe.
''Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from
a desire to contribut to the attainment of a stable and durable peace,
my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration.
On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in
scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis
for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential ques
tion of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuo
lear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific tech
niques a.re not ad.equQ.te to detect existing nuclear weapons. The pro
posed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of
launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be depen
dent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The pro
posals overlook the central problems of European security because they
provide no method for balance and equitable limitations of military
capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe
by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.
"An agreement limited to the e:x:clusion of nuclear weapons from the
territory indicated by your Government without other, tY]?es of limita
tion would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the
security of the Western European countries in view of the large and
widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped
with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would_f.ind themselves
1

Department � State Bulletin, Vol .38, � 19, 1958, PP• 821-822.
'· ��-

96

97
under present circumstances at a. great disadvantage to the numerically
greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of West
ern Europe ·which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equip
ped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles
of all ldnds.
"The considerations outlined above have caused the United States
in association \vith other Western Powers�to propose that nations stop
producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing with such wea.
pons, and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has
further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack,
including an area. in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the
Ural Mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall,
moroover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament
negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard
to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United
States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed
to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by
the development of such devices as intercontinental and inte:rmediate
range ballistic missiles.
"The United States, in association with other Western Powers, has
also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security
aITangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of
Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on
both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise
attD-ok in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of ag
greasion.
"Your note speaks of the existence of opposing military groupings
in Central :&u-ope as being responsible for tensions in the area. It
should not be necessary for me to recall that the present division
of Eu:rope stems primarily from the decision of the Soviet Union not
to permit Eastern DJ.ropean nations to participate in the European
Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many assurances given as to the
defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which
is reflected in its entire organizational and command structure.
The entire history of its creation and development testify to this,
though persistent efforts are ma.de in some quarters to portray it
otherwise.
"In· the absence of effective arrangements either general or re
gional in ch.ara.oter which would pre.mote real security and in view of
the present policies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the countries
of Western Europe along with Canada and ourselves, joined in alliance
�Tith them, have no other recourse than to develop the re4uired pat
tern of integrated NATO military strength and to utilize for defensive
purposes modern developments in weapons and tecbni4ues.
"The views which I have presented above on behalf of my Government
point out the basic reasons why the United States considers that the
Polish Government's proposals for establishing a denuclearized zone in
Central Ew.-ope would not serve to advance their expressed objectives.
Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the initiative of the Polish
Gove:t'lllllent in seeking a solution to these problems. It hopes that this
exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government in seeking

r.

a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchang-e of cor
respondence will enable the Polish Government better to understand
.American proposals in the fields of :European security and disarma
ment. I trust that the :improved relations between Poland and the
United States will serve as a basis for a better understanding be
tween our two countries on these problems, as well as on other
matters."

APPENDIX E
U.S. COMMENTS ON DEVELOFMENTS
l
AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
"Discussions concerning general and complete disarmament are
continuing at the plenary meetings of the conference. Preliminary·
discussions are focusing on the objectives and principles of gene
ral �.nd complete disarmament. What is needed soon is an exploration
of essential substantive·problems requiring agreement before the
precise language of a comprehensive program on general and com
plete disarmament can be developed. The United States believes
that such a concentration of effort would quickly take the confe
rence to the heart of the issues which must be resolved and
hopes that substantive debate may soon begin.
"A Committee of the Whole has been established by the
conference to consider those partial disarmament measures which
the various delegations might wish to submit. The United States
attaches great importance to the work of the Committee •. The
United States has given clear evidence of its support for those
measures which would increase confidence among the nations, faci
litate the disarmament process and reduce the risks of war in
herent in the present international situation. Agreement on an
agenda has not been reached, with priority being given to pro
posals on the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters such as
a cutoff of fissionable material production for use'in weapons and
reduction of the possibility of war by suprise attack, miscal
culation, or failure of communication have also been put forward
for consideration by this Committee.
"In connection with the agenda of this Committee, discussions
have developed as to the attitude of the United states toward the
proposals of the Polish Government which contemplate the estab
lishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe. While it is
recognized that the proposals of the Polish Government, usually
identified as the 'Rapacki plan', have been advanced from a desire
to contribute to the maintenance of peace, ca.reful study of these
suggestions has led the United States to the conclusion that they
would not help to resolve present difficulties.
"The United States, on the other hand, has proposed equitable
measures to this end. These include arrangements for advance noti
fication of military movements, such as transfers of ·large military
units or the firing of missiles, the establishment of observation
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posts at important points within a country, the use of aerial and
mobile inspection teams to improve protection against suprise
attack, and the establishment of a commission to examine the
technical problems involved in measures which could reduce the
risks of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by the United
States could be put into effect immediately without resulting in
one-sided political and military advantages.
"The principal objections of the United States to the Rapacki
plan, which purports to be a confidence-building measure, have
been and remain: (1) that the measures envisaged do not address
themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the Soviet Union,
the use of which against Western Europe has been repeatedly
threatened by Soviet spokesmen; (2) that the plan would there
fore result in a serious military imbalance; (3) that conse
quently, while creating an illusion of progress, it would in
reality endanger the peace of the world rather than contribute to
maintaining it. The dangers to peace resulting from such an
imbalance under present conditions have been clearly and re
peatedly demonstrated by events within memory of all.
"The United States will continue its efforts to focus the
attention of the Committee of the Whole on the proposals it has
brought forward -- at the same time, it is prepared to give
prompt and serious attention to the proposals and suggestions
advanced by other conference members which could offer some hope
of early agreement on concrete measures and which would, in turn,
facilitate progress toward the overal objectives of the conference.
"One initial measure where agreement would do much to set
the work of the conference on the road to success is a nuclear
test ban treaty. On this subject, unfortunately, there has been
no progress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has refused to
accept even the concept of international inspection to monitor
a test ban. The Soviet Union takes this position in opposition
to general scientific opinion and contrary to views held by the
Soviet Government itself since 1957. Nevertheless, the United
States has not aband0ned the hope that the Soviet Government
will recognize that it is acting in defiance of the will of ·
people everywhere and will return to its earlier position that
international verification is necessary for a nuclear test ban
agreement."
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